Rent Withholding for Welfare Recipients:
An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statute
In 1965, Illinois adopted legislation' designed to improve housing
conditions of public aid recipients and to end state subsidization of
slum housing. The statute authorized the state public aid department
to withhold rent allowances from public aid recipients living in substandard buildings and established a defense for recipients against
eviction while rent is being withheld. This study will examine the
effectiveness of this statute as applied by the Cook County Department
2
of Public Aid.

I.

GENERAL STRUCTURE OF RENT WITHHOLDING

This section will examine the judicial and legislative remedies available to tenants in general and will then focus briefly on the specific
Illinois experience with rent withholding prior to its passage of the
1965 Act.
Historically, the common law provides few remedies to the tenant
faced with deteriorating housing.3 Though the tenant has a right to
possession, his landlord has no obligation to maintain the premises in
habitable condition. Further, since the covenants in a lease are independent of each other,4 even if the landlord is required by covenant
or statute to make repairs, his failure to do so generally will not excuse
the tenant from paying rent.5
This body of law developed in a period when long term leases for
large tracts of land were typical, and the tenant's primary purpose was to
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

23, § 11-23 (1969).
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obtain profits from the use of the land.0 The common law considered
the tenant the possessory owner of an estate for years, and the primary
indicia of ownership passed to him. 7 Today, however, most leases for
low income housing are short term and are meant only to provide
living quarters for the tenant. The tenant is more concerned with
habitability than with the possibility of landlord interference with his
8
possession.
The courts have developed two private remedies to force the landlord to repair, but they are of limited assistance to the low income
tenant.9 The first remedy is the constructive eviction doctrine, which
excuses the tenant's rent obligations when the landlord has allowed
the premises to become so dilapidated that he can be said to have
interfered with the tenant's use of the leasehold property. To claim
a constructive eviction, however, the tenant must move within a reasonable time.' 0 The inadequacies of the doctrine for the low income
tenant are obvious. The tenant can never be certain before a judicial
determination whether the doctrine applies to his building. More
importantly, the tenant must move in order to invoke the doctrine,
an undesirable alternative if the supply of low income housing is low
and the cost and disruptive effects of relocation are high.' 1 In the
case of a thirty-day lease, for example, the tenant would save only one
month's rent by moving, which would usually be offset by the cost
and inconvenience involved.
The second judicial remedy is the partial eviction doctrine. If the
tenant is deprived of some portion of the premises before or during
occupancy, he is relieved of paying rent until he gains access to the
entire premises.' 2 The deprivation or ouster must be accomplished
by a physical act of the landlord; judicial interpretation has not yet
extended the doctrine to cover constructive eviction from only a portion of the premises.' 3 The strictness of interpretation has thus ren-

6 Comment, Rent Abatement Legislation: An Answer to Landlords, 12 VmL. L. RE.v.
631 (1967).
7 Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of SubstandardHousing, 53 CAuF.
L. REv. 304, 311 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Rent Withholding]; 1 AMERICAN
LAw oi? PROPERTY, supra note 5, at § 3.38.
8 Comment, Rent Abatement Legislation: An Answer to Landlords, supra note 6.
9 A third remedy has been developed more recently, see notes 14-17 and accompanying
text supra.
10 Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. (N.Y.) 727 (1826); Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of Constructive Eviction in the United States, 1 DE PAUL L. REv. 69 (1951).
11 Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 844 (1965).
12 Fifth Avenue Building Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917); Simmons,
supra note 5, at 577-8; 1 AM.RICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 5, at § 3.52.
13 Gombo v. Martise, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'g 41 Misc.
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dered the partial eviction doctrine of little assistance to the low income
tenant.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
recently developed a third remedy, which seems to provide judicial
authorization for private rent withholding. 14 The court held that a
tenant may be excused from paying all or part of his rent if the landlord breaches, in whole or in part, his implied warranty of habitability. 15 This warranty arises out of the landlord's duty, under the housing
codes, to keep the premises in habitable condition.1 6 If the tenant can
establish breach of warranty, he can withhold rent and continue in
17
possession, presumably until the landlord makes the necessary repairs.
While the far-reaching implications of this decision are unexplored
and the standards the courts will use in determining breach of warranty are still nebulous, this remedy goes further than either the
constructive or partial eviction doctrines in providing an economic
inducement for repair while giving the tenant a right to continued
possession.
In the area of state legislation, the trend in the past two decades
has been toward the development of integrated housing codes regulating structural soundness, fire protection, maintenance, sanitation
and occupancy. Adopted in over 650 cities since 1954,' s these codes
place the burden of maintenance and repair on the landlord.19 How2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1964); Simmons, supra note 5, at 575; Schoshinski,
supra note 3, at 531.
14 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 38 U.S.L.W. 2596 (D.C. Cir., May 7, 1970), rev'g
Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. App. 1968).
15 The court said that principles of modern contract law rather than principles of real
property law should apply to leases of urban apartment dwellers. The expectations of
the tenant in signing the lease are analogized to that of an ordinary consumer. The
lessor is selling a "package of goods and services that indude . . . adequate heat, light
and ventilation, proper sanitation and proper maintenance." 38 U.S.L.W. at 2596.
16 The court in this jurisdiction had earlier held that the landlord had a contractual
duty under the lease to correct violations known to exist at the time the lease was signed.
The theory was that the lease was an illegal contract because it was made in violation
of a statutory provision designed for regulatory or police purposes (i.e., the housing code)
and therefore conferred no right on the wrongdoer (landlord). Brown v. Southall Realty
Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968). The Javins case extends this theory to cases where the
violations arose after the lease was signed, by holding that the housing code imposes
a duty on the landlord to keep the premises in habitable condition.
17 The jury may find that only part of the tenant's obligation to pay rent has been
suspended because the landlord's breach was not total. The tenant will be permitted
to remain in possession, however, as long as he pays as much of the rent as the jury
stipulates.
18 The Housing Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 590, required as a precondition for urban renewal
funds that any city applying for such funds have a plan for code enforcement. Note,
Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, supra note 11, at 803.
19 Id. at 810.
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ever, most codes suffer from a number of administrative problems,
such as lack of adequate administrative machinery, overlap in the
jurisdictions of enforcement agencies, and lack of adequate penalties
for noncompliance. Further, enforcement agencies often have not
attempted to force strict adherence to the codes because they fear such
enforcement may cause landlords either to raise the rent substantially
or to vacate the buildings, thereby forcing low income tenants to seek
other housing accommodations in a shrinking low income housing
market.20 These difficulties, which were dramatized by a series of well
publicized private rent strikes in the early 1960's, led a number of
states to enact rent. withholding legislation. 21 At the present time,
nine states have private rent withholding statutes authorizing the
tenant to withhold, 22 and two states have public rent withholding
statutes authorizing the public aid department to withhold rent al23
lowances from public aid recipients and landlords.
Prior to the adoption of the public rent withholding statute in
1965, rent withholding in Illinois was effected by administrative action
rather than by statute. In August, 1961, the Cook County Department
of Public Aid (hereinafter referred to as the CCDPA or the Department)24 began withholding rent allowances from public aid recipients
living in dwellings which did not meet the minimum standards pre20 Comment, Rent Withholding, supra note 7, at 316-20, 322.
21 In 1963 and 1964, slum dwellers in several large cities initiated a number of rent
strikes in order to force the landlords to maintain the property in accordance with
housing, health and safety codes. Many of the strikes were not only successful in accomplishing their immediate goal of inducing the landlord to make repairs, but also had the
more far-reaching effect of increasing pressure on landlords from code enforcement
agencies and legislatures. Comment, Rent Withholding, supra note 7, at 323-4, 327 n.112;
Withholding Rent: New Weapon Added to Arsenal for War on Slumlords, 21 J. HousINc
67, 70; Note, Rent Strike Legislation-New York's Solution to Landlord-Tenant Conflicts,
40 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 253, 259 (1966); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACrIONs LAw art. 7-A (1965); N.Y.
MULT. DwELL. LAW § 302a (1965).
22 CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 1942 (1960); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2700 (West 1952); MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, §§ 127F, 127H (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 441.570, 441.580 (Supp.
1969); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 202 (1947); N.Y. MULT. DwELL. LAW § 302a (1965); N.Y.
REAL PROP. AcTnoNs LAw § 755 (1965); N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTaONS LAw art. 7-A (1965);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 31 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 1700-1 (1966).
23 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969); N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 143b (1962). In
addition, Michigan has a statute which provides: "No general relief authorized under
this [public welfare] act shall be used to pay rent for any dwelling that does not meet
the standard established under this section [minimum housing standards for the maintenance of health and decency]." MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 400.14c (1967).
24 The Cook County Department of Public Aid is a state agency administering the
state public assistance program in Cook County. The Housing Bureau of the CCDPA
administers all aspects of the housing program of the state assistance program, induding
rent withholding.
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Chicago. 25

The Department
scribed by the housing code of the City of
embarked upon the program because it found itself "most unwillingly
the largest subsidizer of slums in . . . [the] community through the
rental allowances which were made to welfare recipients."2 6 It was
estimated that of the five million dollars paid by the Department
each month in rent allowances, one million dollars was used to pay
rent for grossly substandard housing.27 Thus, it decided to initiate
a program of rent withholding to try to force the owners of slum
properties to repair and improve their buildings.
Under this program the Department withheld rent only from those
landlords who were before the Chancery Division of the Cook County
Court for failure to comply with the housing code. 28 The Department
25 Most rent allowances are paid directly to recipients in their monthly assistance
check, the only exceptions being cases where: (1) the landlord requests direct payment
in consideration for not raising rent above the Department's ceiling, (2) the recipient
is a compulsive alcoholic or narcotic addict, or (8) the recipient has a history of poor
management of assistance grants. In cases where the payments were made directly to
recipients, the Department withheld rent by deleting it from the recipient's check and
informing him not to pay his rent. In cases where the Department made the rent payment directly to the landlord, the Department withheld by stopping payment to the
landlord.
The Department is currently considering changing to a system in which all recipients
will receive their monthly rent allowances directly. Interview with Victor Spallone,
Housing Bureau Chief, CCDPA, in Chicago, April 3, 1970.
26 Statement, Rent Withholding Program, on file in Housing Bureau, CCDPA, in file
entitled "Withheld Rents and Notices of Restoration (1961-62)."
27

Withholding Rent: New Weapon Added to Arsenal for War on Slumlords, supra

note 21, at 67. Today the CCDPA pays some six or seven million dollars in monthly
rentals for over 366,000 persons. "This involves millions of dollars being spent for inadequate housing." Speech by Victor Spallone, Housing Bureau Chief, CCDPA, Urban
Problems Institute Housing Seminar, Chicago, Feb. 18, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Spallone
speech].
28 The Chicago Municipal Code (1969) provides that if the Building Commissioner
finds any building to be in a dangerous or unsafe condition, he is to notify the owner
to repair the building or demolish it. If the owner fails to repair or demolish within
thirty days after the notice is given, the Commissioner may refer the building to the
city's Corporation Counsel for suit. The Corporation Counsel is authorized to apply to
the Chancery Division of the Cook County Circuit Court for an order authorizing the
city to demolish or repair the building. The cost of such demolition or repair is recoverable from the owner and is made a lien on the property. CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE

§ 39.12 (1969).
In practice, at the Chancery Court proceedings, the Corporation Counsel never requests
an order authorizing the city to repair the building. Instead, the landlord is given an
opportunity to repair, and if he fails to do so, the court may appoint a private receiver
under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (1969). If the landlord fails to repair and if a
private receiver cannot be found or if the building is beyond repair, the court will
authorize the city to demolish the building. In 1968 the Cook County Circuit Court,
Chancery Division, issued 628 mandatory injunctions against landlords to make the
needed repairs, issued 703 vacate orders and appointed 448 private receivers. At the end
of 1968, there were 8416 cases pending in Chaincery. 1968 ProgressReport: Workable Pro-
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restored rents if the case was dismissed from Chancery Court for correction of the violations. Between August, 1961 and June, 1965, rent
was withheld from 1348 families, consisting of 5001 persons, living
in 160 buildings. 29 The passage and implementation of the withholding
statute resulted in significantly increased enforcement: from July,
1965, when the statute went into effect, to December, 1969, the Department withheld rent from 7102 families, consisting of 30,116 persons, living in 1884 buildings.3 0
II.

TiH

ILLINOIS PUBLIC RENT WITHHOLDING STATUTE

The major problem with the pre-statute withholding program was
that landlords could evict for nonpayment of rent those recipients
whose rent allowances were withheld. The Illinois legislature remedied
gram for Community Development, City of Chicago Report to United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development (June 1969).
In addition, the Building Department refers cases with less serious uncorrected violations to the Corporation Counsel for prosecution in the Municipal Division of the Cook
County Circuit Court. In 1968, the Cook County Municipal Court imposed fines totalling
$44,009 on landlords owning 2040 buildings. Id.
Prior to 1970, the time between initial inspection and referral to the Corporation
Counsel could take from four to eight months because the procedure used by the Building
Department gave landlords many opportunities for delays and continuances. Hearings
of the Illinois State Senate Subcomm. on Local Government Services of the Municipal
Corporations Comm., Code Enforcement Problems within the City of Chicago, May 23,
1968, 117-21 [hereinafter cited as the 1968 Hearings] (testimony of Anthony Haswell,
President of the Park West Community Association). According to one Building Department official, in early 1968 the Department began sending the "most severely damaged
properties" to the Corporation Counsel immediately, rather than through the regular
Building Department procedure. Id., July 9, 1968, at 12-14 (testimony of Abel D. Swirsky,
Chicago Building Department, Deputy Commissioner, Division of Community Conservation
and Development).
In early 1970, the Building Department instituted a new policy whereby the Chief of
Compliance of the Department decides after the initial inspection whether: (I) the owner
will be given thirty days to comply, (2) the building will be referred to the Compliance
Board, or (3) it will be referred to Corporation Counsel for court proceedings. The decision will depend on the seriousness of the violations. This new procedure should considerably shorten the time between initial inspection and compliance or demolition.
Interview with James Brick, District Director, Compliance Division, City of Chicago
Building Department, in Chicago, April 21, 1970.
20 According to the Department's records, the total of rent withheld per month during
the four-year period was $81,433. The Department obtains this figure by adding all the
individual rent allowances for all recipients from whom rent was withheld at any time
during the period. Since in most cases, the rent was probably withheld for more than
one month, however, the figure should be regarded as an underestimate of the amount
actually withheld in the period. On the other hand, since the figure is based on the
Department's central files, it may be somewhat inflated, because in nearly 10% of the
sample cases where the Central Administrative Office believed rent was being withheld,
there were no recipients in the buildings at the beginning of the withholding period.
so The total amount of rent withheld per month during the period was $595,126.
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this problem in the 1965 statute by establishing a defense against
eviction during withholding.
The statute provides that if the public aid department knows that
a building occupied by public aid recipients "violates any law or
ordinance establishing health and safety standards and by reason thereof is in a condition dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or
health, it shall report the building to the appropriate municipal or
county authority which shall promptly investigate and report its findings" to the Department. If this report establishes violations, the
Department shall notify the owner or his agent that unless violations
are corrected within ten days, rent allowances or direct payments will
be withheld. 31
As Figure 1 indicates, the administration of the rent withholding
statute is extremely complex.
The enforcement process can be divided into two general stagesthe referral stage and the withholding stage.
1., The referral stage. The CCDPA's implementation of the statute
begins with the receipt of the initial complaint by the Central Administrative Office of the CCDPA (hereinafter referred to as the CAO).
The CAO receives complaints from three sources: its own housing
consultants, the City of Chicago Building Department, and community
groups. The housing consultants, working out of fifteen district offices,
are responsible for inspecting all recipient moves which are planned
in advance 32 and all recipient occupied buildings on which complaints
31 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969). It appears from the wording of the statute,
that, in order for the Department to withhold rent, the violations need not be actually
in the dwelling unit occupied by the recipients, but rather may be in any part of the
building, even in dwelling units occupied by nonrecipients. In practice such a situation
probably occurs infrequently, however, because the condition of most of the withholding
buildings is so poor that there will be violations either in the recipient's dwelling unit
or in the common areas of the building.
32 Each district office has a housing unit consisting of a housing consultant with from
one to three investigators under him. For purposes of simplicity the discussion in the
text refers only to the housing consultant rather than to the housing unit or the investigators. Since only half of the 4000 monthly moves by Cook County recipients are planned
in advance, it is often impossible for an investigation to be made before the move occurs.
Statement by Victor Spallone, before the Advisory Committee to the Cook County Department of Public Aid, in Chicago, Jan. 21, 1970.
If the housing consultant is informed of a move in advance, an inspection of the building
will be made before the move, and authorization will be given only if the building meets
the housing standards. Spallone speech, supra note 27. Unfortunately, due to the acute
low income housing shortage in Chicago, many moves apparently cannot be technically
authorized but simply must be acquiesced in by the housing consultant. For example,
in December, 1969, of the 2603 inspections conducted for planned recipient moves known
in advance by the housing consultants, 65% of the inspections revealed sound structures,
24% deteriorated, and 11% dilapidated. Of this last group, less than 10% of the recipients
involved were placed in diffe'rent housing. Report of Housing Consultants for the month
of December, 1969, Cook County Department of Public Aid [hereinafter cited as Housing
Consultants Monthly Report].
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of code violations are received. 33 The housing consultant files a hous-

ing survey report 34 with the CAO for those buildings in which he
35
finds violations.
33 In December, 1969, the housing consultants or their investigators received 3724 new
requests for inspections. Of these, approximately 28% involved complaints concerning
building code violations in recipient occupied buildings, approximately 71% involved
requests for inspection of a nonrecipient occupied building because of a planned move
by a recipient, and 1% involved requests for inspection of nonrecipient occupied buildings
for future reference by the housing unit. Housing Consultants Monthly Report, supra
note 32. Complaints come primarily from caseworkers, but also from recipients, community
groups, and city aldermen. When the CAO receives complaints from these or other sources,
it refers the complaints to the proper housing consultants.
34 The housing survey report is a Chicago Building Department form which contains
information about the location, ownership, occupancy, type and condition of the building.
Interview with William Taylor, Housing Consultant, Midway District Office, Cook County
Department of Public Aid, in Chicago, Feb. 11, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Interview with
Housing Consultant].
35 If the housing consultant does not personally inspect, he must verify the housing
survey report submitted by his investigators. The report must be forwarded by the housing
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When the CAO receives a housing survey report, or a report of
violations from a community group, it forwards the report to the
Building Department for verification.88 Such verification is unnecessary for complaints initiated by the Building Department, which sends
to the CAO all cases which have been referred to the Corporation
Counsel for prosecution in the Chancery Court.37 Once, verification
or the Chancery Court complaint is received, the CAO requests breakdown reports from the district offices. These reports inform the CAO
whether there are public aid recipients in the building, and if so,
how many.38
2. The withholding stage. If there are recipient occupants, a CAO
staff member decides whether the violations are serious enough to
warrant withholding.3 9 If they are, the landlord's name and address
consultant to the CAO within five working days after the inspection is made. Bulletin
70.24, Procedures for Withholding and Restoration of Rental Payments, CCDPA, May 8,
1970, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Bulletin 70.24]. Of the 3637 inspections of recipient occupied buildings and inspections for planned moves conducted by the fifteen district housing
units in December, 1969, approximately 329 housing survey reports, or 8%, were forwarded to the CAO. Housing Consultants Monthly Report, supra note 32.
The housing consultant also contacts the landlord and asks him to make the necessary
repairs. If the landlord is uncooperative, or the consultant has reason to believe that he
will not act in good faith, the consultant informs him that his rent will be withheld or
that there will be court action if he fails to make the repairs. Housing Consultant Taylor
said that he threatens the landlord with court action rather than with withholding. Taylor
said that he knows that many landlords, if forced into court, will comply. Interview with
Housing Consultant, supra note 34. For a discussion of Building Department procedure
concerning referral of cases to Corporation Counsel, see note 28 supra.
36 In some cases the Building Department sends a report of a previous inspection and
in other cases it conducts a new inspection.
37 The buildings referred to the CAO by the Building Department are sent either in
a list of buildings or in that part of the Chancery Court complaint which indicates the,
existing code violations. If only a list is sent, then the CAO writes to the Building Department asking for the complaint so that it may obtain an official list of the violations.
See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
38 The study revealed that the CAO requests a breakdown report for every building on
which the Building Department report indicates violations. A CAO staff member then
reviews the building file after a breakdown, indicating whether recipients live in the
building, is received, and makes a determination as to whether the violations are serious
enough to warrant withholding. Interview with Victor Spallone, Morton Miller and
Samuel Barenbaum, Housing Bureau, CCDPA, in Chicago, April 13, 1970 [hereinafter
referred to as Interview with CAO staff]. See notes 112-5, 130-4 and accompanying text
infra for an examination of the data pertaining to the breakdowns.
The breakdown information is usually not filed with the initial housing survey report because: (1) there were no recipients in the building when the report was filed or
(2) if the building did contain recipients at that time, they will have moved by the
time the Building Department report is received. If the breakdown information is filed
with the housing survey report, the CAO will not request another breakdown after
receipt of the Building Department report unless the breakdown is over six months
old. Interview with CAO staff; Interview with Housing Consultant, supra note 34.
89 In making this determination, the CAO attempts to evaluate each case individually
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are typed on a withholding notification form letter which must be
signed by the Director of the CCDPA.40 If repairs are not made within
ten days after the notification letter is mailed, the CAO sends a withholding memorandum to all district office supervisors and housing
consultants, directing them to withhold rents from the building in
41
question.
Under the statute, if the Building Department, or other appropriate
agency, determines that the violations have been corrected within
ninety days after the notification letter was mailed, all withheld rent
is to be paid.42 Prior to 1970, the CAO required housing consultant
verification of the Building Department's determination that violations
had been corrected before it would restore rents. 43 After verification,
the CAO sends a memorandum ordering immediate restoration to
all district office supervisors and housing consultants. A disbursing
order, payable to the landlord, 44 is drawn in the amount of rent with45
held during the withholding period.
If the repairs are not made within ninety days, due to the "fault
or negligence" of the landlord, the statute authorizes the Public Aid
in terms of the people involved, the state of the building and the condition of the
neighborhood. Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
40 Prior to 1970, the notification letters were usually not sent immediately after the
breakdown was received, but rather in group mailings every few months. See note 165
infra. In serious cases, however, the letter was sent immediately after the breakdown
was received. Under the Department's current procedure, all notification letters are sent
out as soon as possible after the report is received. Interview with Victor Spallone, supra
note 25.
41 The purpose of sending the withholding memo to all district office supervisors and
housing consultants is to aid them in authorizing planned moves outside their districts.
Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
42 The statute does not specify to whom the withheld rent is to be paid. Presumably
it would be paid to the owner, lessor or management agent to whom the tenants made
their rent payments. See note 44 infra for a discussion of the Department's restoration
policy when ownership changes after the initiation of withholding.
43 See notes 60 & 62-70 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of what constitutes proof of compliance and verification.
44 If the owner at the time of restoration is not the same person as the owner at the
time of the initial withholding, the new owner will be paid only the amount of rent
which was withheld while he owned the building. Any amounts withheld before he became owner will be paid to the previous owner. In practice, the new owner generally
obtains an assignment of the previous owner's rights, allowing the Department to pay
all rent directly to the new owner. Interview with Victor Spallone, Housing Bureau
Chief, CCDPA, in Chicago, Feb. 13, 1970.
45 The memorandum is sent to all district office supervisors and housing consultants
because back rent must be restored for all recipients who lived in the building at any
time during the withholding period. While the housing consultant in the district where
the building is located has primary responsibility for restoration, he must obtain information concerning recipients who moved from the housing consultant in the district
to which they moved.
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Department to deduct 20 per cent of the payments withheld as an
"administrative penalty." For each thirty-day period thereafter, during
which violations remain uncorrected, 20 per cent of the withheld rent
for that period is deducted. If all repairs are made before the expiration of any subsequent thirty-day period, the 20 per cent penalty is
prorated over the period that violations still existed. 46 The Department
may, subject to these 20 per cent penalty provisions, make partial
payment of the withheld rent if the violations have been partially
corrected and there is proof of a good faith effort to correct all violations.
Finally, the statute provides that in any action brought against a
recipient for nonpayment of rent withheld under the statute, it is
a valid defense to show that existing violations remain "of a character
confirmed in a report of a municipal or county authority as dangerous,
hazardous or detrimental to life or health." The report is prima facie
evidence of the existence of violations. The public aid department
is permitted to intervene on behalf of the recipient in any such action
for nonpayment "or in any other action for nuisance or otherwise"
47
brought by the landlord or his agent during the withholding period.
Before examining the problems that arise in the referral and withholding stages of the administrative process, a brief discussion of the
research methods used in this study is warranted. The basic source
of information was the records of the enforcement agency. The GAO
maintains a file for each building on which a complaint has been
received. There is also a control card for each building, which theoretically contains all major entries in each building file.48 The universe
of the sample analyzed consisted of all buildings first entered on the
46 The 20% penalty provision became effective July 24, 1969. The Department's policy
is to apply the penalties only in those cases where withholding began after the effective
date of the amendment. It does this even in those cases, subsequent to the amendment,
where the pre-amendinent form notification letter was used, even though the letter did
not contain specific reference to the penalty provisions. The Department's justification for
this procedure is that the pre-amendment notification letter did state that withholding
would be carried out "pursuant to the statute and amendments." Interview with CAO

staff, supra note 38.
There is no discussion of the penalty provisions in the analysis of the sample because
the CAO did not begin implementing the provisions until after the study concluded.
47 In addition, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23.1 (1969) provides that should the landlord of any building occupied by recipients from whom rent allowances are being withheld cause the termination of utility services in that building, the Public Aid Department
is authorized to pay for those utility services and to be reimbursed from the withheld

rent.
48 The control cards were not accurate in all cases. For example, many did not contain all the major entries in the file and a few contained information which was inaccurate. Therefore, it is possible that some 1968 initiated cases were excluded from
our universe and, similarly, that some non-1968 cases were included.
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control card 49 in 1968.0 These cases were listed in the same order
in which they were filed by the CAO, i.e., alphabetically by street
name and then numerically by street address. Of the 1635 cases initiated
in 1968, a systematic sample of every eighth case, or 204 cases, was
selected. 51 For these cases, all information available in the GAO files,
49 The first entry on most of the control cards was either "Check List Sent," the
date on which the housing survey report was forwarded to the Building Department,
or "Report from Building Department," the date on which the list of buildings referred to Corporation Counsel for prosecution was received at the CAO.
In defining our universe we encountered two problems. First, the "Check List Sent"
date accurately indicates when the case came to the attention of the CAO but not when
the housing consultant received the complaint which led to his inspection. Since usually
only a short period of time elapsed between actual inspection and referral to the Building Department, in determining which cases fell within our universe we checked those
cases which had as the first entry on the control card "Check List Sent" in the first 15
days of January, 1963, in order to establish if the initial inspection actually occurred in
December, 1967. We followed no comparable procedure for January, 1969, and because
of this, we undoubtedly omitted from the universe some cases which were initiated in
December, 1968, but which were not referred to the Building Department until January,
1969.
However, to have separated all the 1968 cases from tfie 1969 initiated cases would
have proved virtually impossible because although 80% of the cases were referred by
the CAO to the Building Department within 15 days after they were received from the
housing consultant, some cases were retained in the district office for as many as 85
days before being forwarded to the CAO for referral.
Because of these "stragglers," we chose to cut the sample at December 31, 1968. If
the housing survey report had not yet been referred to the Building Department at
that time, we did not include the building in the universe. The exclusion of these few
cases does not appear to have prejudiced the sample since we found very few seasonal
variations. We found nothing unique about the cases initiated in January, 1968 or those
initiated in the first part of December, 1968 when compared with cases initiated during
the remainder of the year.
Second, in determining which cases had actually been initiated in 1968, we faced the
problem that many cases were technically already open as of January 1, 1968. Although
they had been initiated prior to 1968, they had stagnated in the administrative processes.
To maintain the accuracy of the universe, we treated these cases as having been initiated
as of the earliest date, either initial inspection by the district office or the initial referral
from the Building Department, and not as being within the 1968 cases. Consequently,
even if new housing survey reports or new Building Department reports were filed with
the CAO during 1968 on these buildings, these cases were not considered as having
been initiated in that year for the purposes of our study. Since the files in no way indicated which subsequent housing survey reports were follow-ups on the part of the
housing consultants in the district offices, it was almost impossible to distinguish a follow-up from an entirely new complaint. Those cases which had been officially closed
prior to, or during, 1968, and reopened in that year were included in the universe. Further, in the very few instances where the file had been opened, dosed and reopened all
in the year 1968, we counted them as two separate cases.
50 The calendar year 1968 was chosen for two reasons: (I) in order to allow all sample cases at least one year to reach final disposition, and (2) in order to allow the Public
Aid Department three full years in which to resolve any initial administrative problems.
51 The nature of the CAO's filing system, the fact that no two city blocks in Chicago
are identical, and the fact that the number of recipient buildings per block varies con-
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as well as selected specific information from the district offices, was
obtained. For all withholding cases for which the CAO files indicated
that compliance had not been achieved, a questionnaire was sent to
the district office to determine whether public aid recipients still resided in the building and whether the building remained substandard.
For those cases which never reached withholding, a similar questionnaire was sent to the district offices to determine the present condition
of the buildings. This material was supplemented with inspections
of Building Department records and interviews with housing consultants, landlords, judges and various members of the staff at the
CAO.
The remainder of this paper will consider (A) problem areas in
the enforcement process, (B) an evaluation of enforcement, and (C)
criteria for effective enforcement.
A. General Problems in the Implementation of the Statute
While the statute explicitly delineates the procedures to be followed
in withholding and restoration, the study revealed a number of problems in the CCDPA's implementation of the statute.
1. The Role of the Recipient. The individual public aid recipient
has no control over the withholding process. Only after the CAO
decides to withhold is the recipient informed that his rent allowance
will be deleted from his monthly check. Although the CAO staff main52
tains that most recipients do not object to having their rent withheld,
one housing consultant said that some recipients do object and ask
the Department to restore rent, but that the Department refuses.5 3
Further, in some cases of landlord coercion, the recipients continue
to pay rent "under the table" even though they no longer receive
rent allowances. The Department is rarely able to detect such cases,
but they undoubtedly exist.5 4
It is ironic, in light of the lack of control recipients exercise over
tribute to the representativeness of the sample. Thus, throughout the remainder of this
study, we shall proceed on the assumption that, except where noted, what is true for
the sample is true for all cases initiated in 1968.
52 Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
53 Interview with William Taylor, Housing Consultant, Midway District Office, CCDPA,
in Chicago, May 1 and 2, 1969. These interviews were conducted before the Department
instituted its present policy of allowing all recipients an informal hearing before any
deduction is made from their monthly allotment. See note 56 and accompanying text
infra. In later interviews, however, Housing Consultant Taylor indicated that the current policy actually does little to influence the recipient's control over the withholding
process. See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
54 Interview with Redmond Peters, Administrative Assistant to Bureau Chief, CCDPA,
in Chicago, April 11, 1969.
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the withholding process, that the underlying philosophy of public assistance is that the recipient should be free to control his own fate.5 5 Some
aspects of the Department's procedure seem to embody the philosophy
of recipient self-reliance, but in practice do little to apply that philosophy to rent withholding. For example, the Department notifies the
recipient, ten days prior to the deletion of his rent allotment, of the
amount of and reasons for the deduction and of his right to a hearing
to contest it. 0 This notification is an empty formality, however, for
the recipient has no control over the initial withholding decision and,
in order to change the decision, he must prove at a hearing that there
57
are no violations.
The restoration procedure also gives only lip service to the philosophy of recipient self-reliance. When restoration of rent is ordered,
the recipient must sign a disbursing order, previously prepared by the
caseworker, assigning his rights to the rent so that the state comptroller
can pay it directly to the landlord. The assignment is necessary since the
withheld rent theoretically belongs to the recipient and cannot be released without his consent. Moreover, the CCDPA recently instituted
a new operating procedure, effective May 8, 1970, which has eliminated
the requirement that the recipient sign the disbursing order, thus removing any pretense that the withheld rent belongs to the recipient.
While the statute apparently authorizes the Department to deny
55 The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1964), provides that state public
assistance programs which use federal funds should make "money payments" to recipients.
The Social Security Administration has transformed this into the "money payments"
principle.
The provision that assistance shall be in the form of money payments is one of
several provisions in the act designed to carry out the basic principle that assistance comes to the needy persons as a right ....
The Social Security Administration's interpretation of "money payments" recognizes that a recipient of assistance,
does not, because he is in need, lose his capacity to select how, when and whether
each of his needs is to be met.
Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Handbook
of Public Assistance Administration, Part IV, § 5120, Sept. 26, 1947.

50 This standard form letter is sent to recipients whenever the Department intends
to decrease or terminate their monthly allotment. In some cases, the recipient is informed
of the Department's intended decision by the caseworker in person rather than by mail.
Such notification is intended to provide the recipient with an opportunity for a hearing
prior to the reduction or termination. The Department began this notification procedure
following Golliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1969), in which the court
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the welfare department to give a recipient notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to any reduction
or termination of his monthly allotment. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970),
where the United States Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion.
57 Housing Consultant Taylor said that if the recipient wishes to contest the decision
to delete his rent allotment, he must in effect prove the landlord's case. This will be
virtually impossible in most instances, because the landlord will not have corrected the
code violations. Telephone conversation with William Taylor, Housing Consultant, Midway District Office, CCDPA, in Chicago, Feb. 19, 1970.
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recipient control over withholding, this denial seems unjustified. The
underlying principle of public assistance, as discussed above, is that
the recipient should be free to control his own fate; the Department's
procedures directly conflict with this philosophy. Moreover, the basic
argument urged in support of the Department's position, that recipient
control would seriously dilute the effectiveness of rent withholding,
seems doubtful in light of the effectiveness of recipient control experienced in those states having private rent withholding programs."'
2. Notificationof Withholding. The statute requires the Department
to notify the landlord, by registered or certified mail, of its decision
to withhold at least ten days before the decision goes into effect.5 9
Figure 2 indicates that in the sample group the Department mailed
fifty-seven initial withholding notification letters. Thirteen of these letters were returned to the Department marked "unclaimed," "addressee
unknown," or "moved, no forwarding address." The Department attempted to obtain new information from the housing consultants concerning the addressee in all thirteen cases. In eight of these cases the
Department received new information and sent a second letter.6 0 In
the five cases for which no new information was received, the Department withheld in one without sending a second letter and dropped the
other four from the enforcement process.
These last five cases present a problem frequently confronted by the
Department: what to do when the landlord refuses to accept the letter.
The Department's stated policy in such cases, in conformity with the
statute, is not to withhold unless it is clear that the landlord refused
to accept, and that the refusal was due to his knowledge of the nature
of the letter.6 1 In the one case in which the Department withheld without sending a second letter it apparently believed that the landlord had
knowingly refused the first letter.
The Department undoubtedly faces a difficult task in determining
whether the landlord refused to accept because he knew the letter was
a rent withholding notice. If the letter is returned marked "refused,"
58 The growing awareness by tenants and public aid recipients of the power they can
exercise through organizations such as tenant unions and welfare rights organizations
would tend to discredit the Department's position. Further, only Illinois and New York
have public rent withholding statutes while other states have adopted private withholding
statutes which are by definition dependent upon tenant control. See notes 22-23 supra
and accompanying text.
59 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969).
60 In seven of the eight cases where a

second letter was sent, the landlord accepted
the letter; in six of these cases, the Department subsequently withheld rent, and in the
seventh the landlord complied before withholding. In the one case where the letter was
not accepted after the second mailing, all the public aid recipients had moved before
the Department obtained new information concerning the landlord.
61 Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
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it could be persuasively argued that the landlord had received constructive notice; none of the returned letters were marked "refused," however. It is likely that some of the "unclaimed" letters were, in reality,
refused. In some cases the landlord, while unavailable when delivery was
first attempted, may have failed to claim the letter because he knew it
was a withholding notification. In other cases the landlord may have
simply denied his own existence and told the postman that no such person lived at that address. While the Department apparently decides on a
case by case basis whether the landlord knowingly refused the letter,
the standards used in making this determination, if any, are unknown.
Permitting landlords to circumvent the withholding process by simply
failing to claim the notification letter is clearly contrary to both logic
and legislative intent. Yet this occurred in four of the fifty-seven cases
for which letters were initially sent. This could have been prevented by
either sending the second notification in a plain envelope, as was done
in one case, or by attempting to personally contact the landlords. While
the latter may not meet the strict statutory requirements of notice, it
can be justified as within the purposes of the statute. To meet these
notification problems, the statute might be amended to allow notice
by means other than registered or certified mail.
Finally, if one of the reasons for the ten-day notification letter is to
provide the landlord with an opportunity to repair or begin repair
before withholding, the letter seems to be of little value. Since, in most
cases, ten days simply is insufficient to repair serious violations, it may
be that the legislature expected ten days to be adequate for the landlord at least to begin repairs.
In only ten of the fifty-one cases in which withholding letters were
sent and accepted did the landlord allege that repairs had been completed or were in progress during the ten-day period. In six of these
cases the Department did not withhold at the end of the ten-day
period pending reinspection, but in only one of these six were the
repairs actually completed within the ten days. Thus, the ten-day grace
period seems to be little more than a formality.
3. The Role of the BuildingDepartmentin the Withholding Process.
The statute requires that an appropriate municipal or county authority
determine whether the landlord has complied and whether withheld
rent should be paid.6 2 The appropriate authority in Cook County is
the Building Department. In March, 1970, the CCDPA made significant
changes in its procedure concerning this requirement. 63 The following
ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969).
63 On March 18, 1970, the Housing Bureau Chiefj Victor Spallone, and the City of
62 ILL. REV. STAT.

Chicago Building Commissioner, Joseph Fitzgerald, formulated a new procedure con.
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discussion focuses primarily on the previous procedure, however, because it was applied during the sample year and is helpful in explaining
some of the data.
Under the old procedure, the Department would not restore rents
unless the landlord obtained a certificate of inspection from the Build.
ing Department indicating that no violations existed. 64 It was almost
impossible for a landlord to obtain such a certificate if the Building
Department inspector knew that there were public aid recipients in
the building or that the Public Aid Department was withholding rent.65
Moreover, the Department would not order restoration unless there
had been a housing consultant determination that no violations existed.
This procedure was followed even where the landlord had obtained a
Building Department certificate indicating no violations or a dismissal
from Chancery Court based on a Building Department inspector's testimony.06 Continued withholding in these cases would seem to contravene
the statute, which authorizes the Building Department to make the
determination as to compliance.
This divergence from the statute was generally inconsequential, however, since the housing consultant inspections usually confirmed the
Building Department certificates. But the divergence was important
in the few cases where the housing consultant reported violations after
cerning determination of code compliance pursuant to restoration. The sample cases
pre-date the new policy. See notes 64 & 70 and accompanying text infra.
84 In some instances the housing consultant, on his own initiative, may recommend
restoration before the landlord has obtained a certificate of inspection. In such cases,
the CAO will first check the building file for the last Building Department inspection.
If it appears that the building could have been repaired between the last Building Department inspection and the housing consultant's inspection, the CAO will then ask
the Corporation Counsel if there is a Chancery case pending on the building. If there is
none, the CAO will order restoration. Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
65 But Housing Consultant Taylor said that if the landlord could obtain such a
certificate and the housing consultant found the building to be substandard, he would
recommend restoration. Interview with Housing Consultant, supra note 34. The reluctance
to issue such certificates was largely a result of the 1968 Hearings, supra note 28.
66 It is not entirely clear how this policy would have affected situations in which the
landlord obtained a Chancery Court dismissal while the housing consultant reported that
violations still existed. Even though the Chancery proceeding is, in effect, a court adjudication on the question of compliance, the Department still required a housing consultant
inspection and recommendation before it would restore.
In practice this requirement may have been little more than a formality, because as
Housing Consultant Taylor indicated, if the landlord presented a Chancery Court dismissal, he felt somewhat compelled to recommend restoration because he feared that
he might be cited for contempt if he did not.
His fear of being held in contempt notwithstanding, Taylor still reinspected before
recommending restoration, even if the landlord had presented a Chancery Court dismissal.
He said, however, that since the 1968 Hearings, he found all the buildings for which
landlords had obtained a Chancery Court dismissal to be in compliance. On the other
hand, he did say that in one such building he considered the porch to be structurally
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the building inspector said none existed. 67 The CCDPA's policy in such
cases was to accept the housing consultant's inspections and recommendations concerning restoration. The CCDPA reasoned that the landlord could obtain a court hearing to challenge its decision; if the court
ordered restoration, the Department would comply. 68 In a few cases
the courts did order restoration even though the Department considered the building dangerous to the health and safety of its occu69
pants.
The CCDPA's new procedure conforms more closely to the statutory
language. The Department still requires the landlord to obtain a certificate of inspection before restoration, but the Building Department
will now issue such certificates, indicating existing violations, upon
request by the landlord. 70 If the certificate reports no violations, the
CAO will order immediate restoration. If the certificate indicates violations, the CAO will determine whether they are serious enough to
warrant continued withholding.
Under the new procedure the housing consultant will not reinspect
defective, but that he was willing to defer to the "expertise" of the building inspector
and recommended restoration of withheld rent. Later, when the porch collapsed, Taylor
filed a new housing survey report to again begin the withholding process. Interview with
Housing Consultant, supra note 34.
What the other housing consultants would have done if the building still had serious
violations after dismissal is unclear. To order restoration and then file a new housing
survey report in order to again begin the withholding process, however, would not seem
to have been the proper response because not only would it have given the landlord
his back rents, but also his current rents until withholding could again be instituted.
The Housing Bureau Chief stated that "our experience demonstrates a preponderance
of erroneous Chancery Court dismissals." Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38. The
sample cases, however, indicated that erroneous dismissals were rare.
67 While the sample group indicated that such disparity was infrequent, the Housing
Bureau Chief maintains that it occurred in a majority of cases. Interview with CAO staff,
supra note 38.
Among other things, it was discovered at the 1968 Hearings that Building Department
inspectors had in a number of cases issued certificates of inspection to slum landlords
and testified in Chancery Court that no violations existed in buildings on which the
Department was withholding rent, while housing consultants reported that these buildings still had major code violations. 1968 Hearings, supra note 28. While six Building
Department inspectors were indicted for these activities in July, 1969, no convictions
have, as yet, resulted. Interview wiith Victor Spallone, supra note 44. See Chicago SunTimes, Feb. 20, 1970, at 4.
68 Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
69 Id.
70 At the meeting, the Building Commissioner explained that the reason that some
certificates indicating no violations had been issued in the past when some violations
did in fact exist is that such certificates were routinely issued for the sale of real property.
On such certificates, his department listed only those violations which it considered
serious and which would not be obvious to a potential buyer. Now the Building Department will list all violations when a landlord requests a certificate of inspection for a
building on which rent is being withheld. Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
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the building to verify the inspection certificate. If after restoration
the housing consultant informs the CAO that serious violations still
exist, however, the CAO will request the Building Commissioner to
order a new inspection. Thus, the emphasis of the new procedure is on
working with, rather than around, the Building Department.
4. Delay in Restoration. The statute provides that rent payments
are to be restored when all violations are corrected.7 1 In some cases,
however, restoration is not effected until long after compliance. Landlords complained of excessive delays in two of the fifteen sample cases
72
which reached compliance.
In the five compliance cases for which figures were available, the
housing consultants inspected an average of 21 days after the landlord
presented a certificate of inspection or a Chancery Court dismissal to
the CAO. In two of these cases the consultant failed to inspect until
more than 34 days had passed.7 3 The reasons for these delays are unclear.
The CAO's preparation of the restoration memorandum does not
seem to be a significant source of delay. The average time between the
housing consultant's restoration recommendation and the CAO's preparation of the memorandum was seven days.74 But in over 58 per cent
of the cases the time was three days or less, and in only 17 per cent did
it exceed two weeks.
Although no figures are available, the disbursing order procedure
is probably the most important source of delay. The caseworker is
responsible for preparing a disbursing order for each recipient in the
building. The housing consultant must then verify the order and, after
71 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969). This is of course subject to the 20% penalty
provisions and to the partial repair/partial restoration provision. For a discussion of the
latter, see notes 79-83 and accompanying text infra.
72 In one case, 114 days after the CAO ordered restoration the landlord complained
that he had not as yet received the disbursing order; in the other case the landlord complained after 28 days. A more relevant figure would be the time from when the housing
consultant recommended that the CAO restore the rent to when the landlord last complained that he had not received the disbursing order. However, this figure was only
available in the second case, namely 32 days.
73 Only five of the fourteen compliance cases had the relevant dates available. The
figures for each of the five, in days, are: 1, 6, 22, 35, 43. Unfortunately, dates were not
available in the two compliance cases where the landlords complained of delays in receiving their disbursing orders.
It should be noted that in many cases the landlord falsely alleges compliance. Therefore,
some delay in reinspecting by the housing consultant may be justified if the landlord
is known by the housing consultant to be a disreputable slum landlord. However, if
the landlord presents a certificate of inspection from the Building Department or a
Chancery Court dismissal it would seem that the housing consultant should reinspect
almost immediately.
74 Dates were available in twelve of the fourteen compliance cases. The lengths of time,
in days, were: three days or less (seven cases), 6, 13, 14, and 19 (two cases).
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verification, the caseworker must have both the recipient and the landlord sign the order. Apparently the time required for obtaining the
signatures depends upon the workload and diligence of the individual
caseworker. In many instances the caseworker apparently mails the
disbursing order to the recipient, requesting him to sign it, obtain the
landlord's signature, and return it to the caseworker.75 The potential
delays in such a procedure are obvious.
The CCDPA. has recently changed this procedure. Under the new
procedure, the housing consultant sends an invoice voucher directly
to the landlord, who simply signs and returns it. The recipient's signature is not required.76 While this procedure should speed up the
restoration process considerably, it removes whatever pretense might
7
previously have existed that the withheld rent belongs to the recipient. T
A third source of delay in restoration arises when the recipient moves
from one district to another. The disbursing order must be prepared
by the recipient's present caseworker and verified by his present housing
consultant. Close cooperation is obviously required between the present
and former housing consultants if delay is to be held to a minimum.
Further, a long delay may occur if the recipient goes off public assistance. Presumably, the former recipient's last caseworker would prepare
the disbursing order. If the former recipient has moved from that caseworker's district, the caseworker must mail the disbursing order to the
recipient and request a return. The new procedure eliminates most of
this delay, however, for the recipient is not required to sign the
voucher.78
5. Partial Repair/PartialRestoration Provision. The statute provides that upon "proof of good faith effort to correct all the violations"
and "upon partial correction of violations" the Department may restore
a portion of the rents withheld.79 Partial restoration is apparently intended as a reward to encourage the landlord to complete repairs and
to provide him with funds with which to do so. However, in only one
of the fifteen cases in which compliance was achieved did the Department use the partial repair/partial restoration provision.
One housing consultant said that he never used the provision because
most landlords could not be trusted to apply the partially restored rents
toward completion of the repairs and that in most cases the withheld
75 Interview with Morton Miller, Administrative Assistant to the Housing Bureau
Chief, CCDPA, in Chicago, Dec. 19, 1969.
76 Bulletin 70.24 at 8, supra note 35.
77 See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
78 Bulletin 70.24 at 8, supra note 35.

79 Irm. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969).
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rents are insufficient to cover the cost of repairs.80 Another reason for
the apparent unpopularity of this provision may be that the "reward"
aspect is ineffective, since the restoration process often requires a great
deal of time.8 '
In place of the partial repair/partial restoration procedure, many
housing consultants follow what may be termed a "partial repair/full
restoration" procedure. In eight of the fifteen compliance cases, housing
consultants recommended, and the CAO ordered, complete restoration
on the basis of partial repair and good faith intention to complete the
repairs. In most of these eight cases, the repairs were 85 to 90 per cent
completed when full restoration was recommended. It is questionable
whether the statute permits this procedure, but, in light of the long
delays often encountered in restoration,8 2 it may be the best way to re83
ward a good faith landlord.
6. The Risk of Eviction. The statute states that a recipient has a
valid defense against eviction during withholding if he shows that
"existing violations of law remain in the building during the period of
residence therein by a recipient of a character confirmed in a report
of a municipal or county authority [i.e., the Building Department] as
dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health."84 The statute
80 Interview with Housing Consultant, supra note 34.
81 See notes 71-78 and accompanying text supra.

Id.
It is questionable whether the statute permits the partial repair/full restoration
procedure. The statute provides that "if all violations are corrected within ninety days
the total rent withheld shall be paid." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969). Further,
...
the legislature specifically provided for the partial repair/partial restoration situation,
and it would appear that where partial repair has been completed, the Department
would be authorized to restore rents only partially. However, if one interprets "violations"
to mean only those violations which cause the building to be "in a condition dangerous,
hazardous or detrimental to life or health," then upon completion of 75% of all repairs,
the landlord may in fact have corrected all the dangerous and hazardous violations.
84 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969). The statutory defense, however, seems to apply
only "in any action of ejectment, distress for rent, or any other action . . . based on nonpayment of rent withheld." This discrepancy seems to raise obvious questions of whether
the defense applies to an eviction action for "nuisance or otherwise" brought during the
withholding period. The Chief of the Bureau of Housing stated that the courts seem to
have no problem with the apparent inconsistency and have allowed rent withholding by
the Department as a valid defense in any eviction action during the period of withholding,
regardless of what the landlord alleges as the reason for the eviction. He also pointed out
that the early versions of the statute did not contain the nuisance wording and that
some landlords were allowed to evict tenants for nuisance, even though the real reason for
the eviction was that the Department was withholding rent. Therefore, the Department
recommended that the statute be amended to allow rent withholding as a valid defense
against eviction for nuisance. Interview with Victor Spallone, supra note 44.
It should be noted that the statute does provide, seemingly unequivocally, that "[n]o
recipient shall be subject to eviction as a result of withholding of rent under this section."
This seems to indicate that the statutory defense applies to any eviction attempted during
82
83
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further declares that the Building Department report shall constitute
"prima facie evidence of a violation or violations."8 5 The statute does
not declare, however, that the report shall constitute prima facie evidence that the violations are "dangerous, hazardous or detrimental
to life or health." Thus, it appears that the final determinations as to
the seriousness of the violations, the validity of the withholding, and
the applicability of the defense against eviction are left exclusively to
the court.
As a result, the court may order eviction simply because the Department improperly withheld rent. While this seems particularly unfair
to the recipient, who has no control over the Department's initial
decision to withhold,8 8 the study revealed that not only was the risk
of court-ordered eviction extremely low, but also that the risk of attempted eviction was low. In only five of the forty-four withholding
cases did landlords attempt eviction, and of the thirteen recipients involved in these five cases, only one was evicted. Moreover, this eviction
did not involve a judicial determination that the violations were not
serious enough to warrant withholding.8 7
The low rate of eviction attempts may be due in part to a landlord
belief that the courts will apply the statutory provisions concerning
eviction liberally in favor of recipients.,, On the other hand, landlords
desiring to avoid the eviction process may attempt to force recipients
to move8 9 through less formal means, such as threatening not to renew
the withholding period or after restoration in retaliation for the withholding. This provision seems to be qualified, however, later in the statute by the provision cited in the text,
so that the defense apparently applies only to those actions brought during withholding.
85 ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969).
86 See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
87 The eviction ordered involved one building where the landlord attempted to evict
five public aid recipients. Apparently, the Department received notice concerning only
four of the five actions. In the fifth, the one tenant against whom eviction was ordered,
notice of the proceedings came to the attention of the Department three months after
the eviction took place, when the landlord sent a notice for back rent. At that time, because the recipient was already settled in another dwelling, the Department did not file a
motion to vacate the judgment. Apparently the courts have allowed the Department to
intervene and have granted motions to vacate eviction orders in similar cases. Interview
with Victor Spallone, supra note 44. Presumably, at least one circuit court judge would
have discovered at the time of eviction proceeding that the individual was receiving public
assistance and would have ordered the clerk to call the CCDPA to ask that a representative
be sent. See note 99 and accompanying text infra.
88 One CAO staff member suggested that another reason is that lawyers attempt to discourage landlord clients from bringing eviction actions because the fee involved is quite
small in relation to the large amount of time spent in court. Statement of Mr. Morton
Miller, Administrative Assistant to Housing Bureau Chief, CCDPA, in Chicago, May 29,
1970.
89 Of course, if the recipient is forced out of the building, either by eviction or landlord
harassment, and the landlord does not repair the building, he will not get the back rent.
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the lease or threatening to discontinue utility services. ° The study suggests that either these threats were not made or that they were not
successful, for nearly 98 per cent of the withholding buildings still had
recipient occupants three and one-half months after withholding began. 91 This data is by no means conclusive, however, for it indicates
only that at least one recipient is presently in the building, it does not
account for the possibility that others might have moved in or out
during the period.
The very low risk of court-ordered eviction indicates that the potential problem of courts applying different standards than the Department in evaluating the seriousness of violations is not a significant one
in Cook County. The explanation may be either that the courts always
agree with the Department's determinations or that the Department
withholds only on buildings with clearly dangerous violations. The
study suggests that the latter is probably more correct, since none of
the withholding cases involved 92simply minor violations, such as a single
broken window or dirty floors.
Problems may arise if the eviction proceeding is initiated after compliance but before restoration,93 since the statutory defense applies only
as long as the violations remain uncorrected.9 4 While technically it
would seem that the defense is not applicable, one circuit court judge,
rather than ordering eviction in such cases, issues continuances to enable the Department to restore rent.9 5
Another potential problem is retaliatory eviction after restoration.
Since most public aid recipients have only thirty-day leases, terminable
by either party upon adequate notice and without cause,98 landlords
90 Landlords may also use the same threats to attempt to get the recipients to make
rent payments even though the Department is withholding their rent allowance.
91 However, only 79% of the withholding buildings still had recipients in them 313 days
after the initiation of withholding. The number of days after withholding that recipients
moved out are: 35, 105, 109 (two cases), 140, 246, 304, 308, 313.
92 One judge indicated that if the violations were mere dirt or litter, he would evict.
Interview with Judge Joseph Hermes, Associate Judge, Cook County Municipal Court,
May 6, 1969. However, since these types of violations appear always to be accompanied by
other more serious violations, the risk of eviction seems to be very small.
The judge also indicated that if the landlord proved that the recipient caused the
violations, he would evict, although such a case has never come before him. This is
interesting because the statute makes no specific provision for landlord defenses and most
landlords argue that the violations are mere "housekeeping" items which are not dangerous, and furthermore that the recipient caused them. Id.
93 In practice, this delay period can be quite long. See notes 71-78 and accompanying
text supra.
94 See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
95 This was the procedure followed by Judge Edith Sampson in one of the sample cases.
96 Wald, Report to the National Conference on Law and Poverty, Washington, D.C.,
June 23-25, 1965, at 13. The Housing Bureau Chief explained that one reason that recip-
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may choose to evict recipients whose rent was withheld. The Department recognizes this as a possible consequence of withholding, but considers itself unable to do anything more than relocate the evicted recip97
ient.
The Department may intervene on behalf of the recipient in any
action "based on non-payment of rent withheld" or "in any other action
for nuisance or otherwise brought by the landlord or his agent while
the rent is being withheld."98 While this provision is of little help in
cases of retaliatory eviction, it is important when eviction is attempted
during withholding. One problem that arises in the implementation
of this provision concerns lack of notice to the Department that eviction
proceedings have been initiated. The recipient is instructed to notify
the caseworker immediately if eviction is attempted. At least one Cook
County judge apparently asks every tenant who does not have counsel
in an eviction proceeding if he is a public aid recipient. If so, the judge
contacts the CCDPA so that a representative can be sent. 99
These proceedings are usually attended by a lawyer from the States
Attorney's Office, which is technically the Department's legal representative, and either a housing consultant or a CAO staff member. The
Department's representative is present not to serve as counsel, but to
assist with building records and requests for new inspections.
7. Case Mortality. This section examines the elimination of cases
from the enforcement process in the referral and withholding stages of
administration.
(a) Case mortality in the referral stage. The referral stage, outlined
in Figure 1, may be divided into four steps: initiation, inspection, request and breakdown. 100 In the initiation step, the CAO receives comients find it difficult to get a year lease is because the Department is not permitted to make
a security deposit with the landlord. Interview with Victor Spallone, supra note 44.
97 Apparently ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (1969) is supposed to protect the tenant from
retaliatory eviction. It provides:
It is declared to be against the public policy of the State for a landlord to terminate or refuse to renew a lease or tenancy of property used as a residence on the
ground that the tenant has complained to any governmental authority of a bona
fide violation of any applicable building code, health ordinance, or similar regulation. Any provision in any lease, or any agreement or understanding purporting
to permit the landlord to terminate or refuse to renew a lease or tenancy for
such reason is void.
However, the statute does not give the Public Aid Department standing to intervene in
behalf of the recipient-tenant but rather it gives the tenant individually an affirmative
defense. And since the burden is on the tenant to prove that the eviction was retaliatory,
this statute appears to offer little aid to a recipient who is the victim of such an eviction.
98 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969).
99 Interview with Victor Spallone, supra note 44.
100 The four steps in the referral stage are:
(1) Initiation Step: For cases initiated by housing consultants and community
groupsInitial inspection by housing consultant or his investigator-
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plaints from housing consultants, community groups and the Building
Department. The CGDPA is itself the most important source of com102
plaints;' 01 housing consultants initiated 73 per cent of the total cases.
The Building Department, through its practice of forwarding Chancery
Court complaints to the CAO,'10 3 referred 27 per cent of the total com04
plaints, while community groups accounted for less than one per cent.
The GAO forwards all housing survey reports, received from housing
consultants, and all letters of complaint, from community groups, 105
to the Building Department for verification. 10 This is done automatically by a clerk, without an evaluation of the violations. Since the
CAO need not request inspection reports for those cases initiated by
Processed at District Office-Forwarded to CAO-Processed (file opened) and referred to Building Department
for inspection
(2) Inspection Step: Building Department receives referral from CAO-Building inspected by Building Department inspector-Inspection report returned to CAO
(5) Request Step: Receipt of Building Department inspection report
Receipt of Building Department initiated cases (Chancery
Court complaints)
Recipient breakdown lists prepared-Breakdown request sent
to District Office
(4) Breakdown Report Step: Receipt of breakdown requests in District OfficesHousing consultant obtains list of recipients in
building either by asking caseworker or by inspecting the building-breakdown report filed
with CAO
101 The source of the complaint is the origin from which the CAO first learns of a

substandard building, i.e., the Building Department, housing consultants or community
groups. If the housing consultant is the origin, the ultimate source is unknown since he
might have received a complaint from a community group, caseworker or recipient. However, the housing consultants receive most referrals from caseworkers. See note 33 and
accompanying text supra.
102 See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra.
103 See note 37 and accompanying text supra. It would appear that the Building Department referrals are a valuable aid to the CCDPA. Almost 30% of the buildings referred to
the CAO by the Building Department had public aid recipients living in them and the
housing consultants had not forwarded the addresses of these buildings to the CAO prior
to the time the CAO received the Building Department's referral.
104 See note 53 supra. This would seem to support the statement of one housing consultant that the Department receives very little help from community groups. However,
the one community group complaint in the sample is not totally representative of community group participation. If the group contacted the housing consultant without at
the same time notifying the CAO, the resulting housing survey report would have been
recorded as a housing consultant initiated case in our sample. Therefore, the community
group role, either directly by filing complaints or indirectly by making recipients more
aware of their rights, might be much greater than the data indicates.
105 Although the housing survey report lists the violations, the letter from the community group merely stated that building code violations existed on the premises and that
public aid recipients lived there.
100 The statute requires that the withholding be based on a report of the intermediate
department or agency responsible for making such determinations. ILL. R v. STAT. ch. 25,
§ 11-25 (1969). See notes 51 & 55 and accompanying text supra.
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the Building Department,"7 it had to request such reports in only 73
per cent of the total cases. The GAO made requests in all cases requiring inspection reports.
The inspection step includes the Building Department inspection
and the return of the inspection report to the GAO. The Building
Department initially returned reports in 60 per cent of the total cases,
or in 82 per cent of the cases for which reports were requested.1 08 This
is a critical stage in the procedure, for if no inspection report is received
the withholding process ends unless the GAO or the housing consultants
follow up on the initial request. The Building Department's failure to
return reports upon initial request temporarily eliminated 13 per cent
of all cases from the enforcement process.
The follow-up procedure, however, recaptured some of this loss. The
CCDPA made a second request in one-third of the cases for which no
Building Department report was initially returned, and the Building
Department returned reports in 62 per cent of these cases.' 09 Thus, the
follow-up procedure recaptured 3 per cent of the original cases. The
failure of the Building Department to return inspection reports,
coupled with the failure of the CCDPA to follow up, eliminated over
10 per cent of all cases from the enforcement process.
The request step begins when the GAO receives either a Building
Department report for those cases initiated by housing consultants or
107 For cases initiated by the housing consultants and community groups, a Building
Department inspection must be obtained. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969). See notes 31
& 33 and accompanying text supra.
108 There was not a single case in the sample in which the Building Department returned a report with no violations in response to the initial request for an inspection. The
fact that a report is not returned on a building is not the equivalent of a no-violation
report. It simply means that no inspection was ever conducted for that building or that
no report of an inspection was forwarded to the CAO.
At the 1968 Hearings the Building Department apparently maintained that it did not
realize that the CCDPA wanted it to return reports on all the housing survey reports
which the CCDPA forwarded to it. Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
109 The CAO was responsible for 63% of the follow-ups which were eventually made
by the CCDPA while the housing consultants accounted for the remainder. At least one
housing consultant attempts to reinspect all buildings within his district once every six
months, and such reinspections provide an excellent method by which housing consultants could follow up on buildings which have been reported to the CAO, but on
which no action has been taken. Interview with Housing Consultant, supra note 34.
Staff members at the CAO stated that the reason no follow-ups were made in a consistent manner was that the Building Department ignored the Department's follow-ups.
Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38. The data does not support such an assertion. In
fact, the Building Department returned inspection reports in 62% of cases referred to
it on a follow-up.
In April, 1970, however, the CAO began a systematic follow-up procedure for all cases
referred to the Building Department since January, 1970 and on which the Building Department had not filed an inspection report. Interview with the CAO staff; Interview with
Mrs. Janet Kendrick, Secretary, Bureau of Housing, CCDPA, April 16, 1970.
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community groups or a copy of the Chancery Court complaint for
those cases initiated by the Building Department. 110 The CAO then
requests the housing consultants to submit a breakdown of the number
of public aid recipients living in the building. It would be possible at
this point to make an evaluation of the seriousness of violations and to
eliminate from the enforcement process those buildings which do not
have serious violations. Instead, a CAO clerk merely lists the buildings
having violations"' and sends these lists every two months112 to the
housing consultants in each district office. 113
As Figure 4 indicates, the CAO should have requested breakdown
reports in 87 per cent of the cases in the sample; 114 the CAO made
110 See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
III Id.
112 According to a CAO staff member, this two-month interval has been eliminated
and breakdowns are now requested immediately upon receipt of either the Building Department report or the Chancery Court complaint. Statement of Mr. Morton Miller, Administrative Assistant, Bureau of Housing, CCDPA, May 29, 1970. This is apparently the
result of the new operating procedure, effective May 8, 1970, which provides that upon
receipt of the Building Department report listing violations the CAO is to telephone
the housing consultant "to determine if there is any current information that would affect
the withholding proceedings." Bulletin 70.24, supra note 35, at 2.
113 Neither the operating manuals in effect in 1968-69 nor the one presently in effect,
supra note 35, delineates a standard breakdown procedure for the housing consultants to
follow. Consequently, housing consultants retura breakdown reports either by telephone
or by memorandum. There is no detailed procedural outline for the clerk at the CAO to
follow in sending and receiving the breakdown reports. Further, many housing consultants
appear to conduct another inspection of the building before returning their report and
make a written recommendation as to withholding. However, in the majority of cases the
housing consultants did not file a later withholding recommendation with the breakdown,
and it can be assumed that by simply reporting the number of recipients, they are agreeing with the CAO decision to withhold.
Because of the lack of a formal breakdown procedure, information on breakdowns was
in a confused state for 1968. In fact, there was often no indication of whether the CAO
had ever requested a breakdown from the housing consultant. For those breakdowns
requested during 1969, the records were in order.
In all cases where rent was withheld, we assumed that a breakdown had been requested
and received by the CAO, even though there might have been no records indicating this.
The mere fact that the CAO had information regarding the number of recipients in a
building is sufficient evidence to establish the request of a breakdown report and its return
by the district office.
114 Housing consultants filed breakdown reports with the housing survey report in
3% of the sample cases. However, the staff of the CAO contends that breakdown reports
are filed with the housing survey reports in the vast majority of cases. Interview with the
CAO staff, supra note 38. Our data does not support this contention, but, on the contrary, it confirms the statement of one housing consultant that only when a housing
consultant wishes to speed up the withholding process does he include a breakdown with
the housing survey report. Housing Consultant Taylor said the reason for the failure to
file breakdown reports was the delay between the filing of the housing survey report and
the actual withholding. Many public aid recipients remain in one location for only a
short period of time and a breakdown report sent too early often becomes obsolete. Interview with Housing Consultant, supra note 34.
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such requests in only 69 per cent of the cases. Thus, 18 per cent of all
cases were dropped from the enforcement procedure by the failure of
the CAO to request breakdown reports.115
The breakdown step involves the return of the breakdown report
by the housing consultant. If the breakdown report is not returned

the withholding process ends, since there is no follow-up on these
cases.:" The housing consultants returned these reports in 58 per cent
of the total cases, or in more than 80 per cent of the cases for which
the CAO requested breakdowns. However, because the housing consultants failed to return breakdown reports, the CAO took no further

action in 11 per cent of the cases."

7

Figure 4 provides a brief summary of the referral stage. Thirty-nine
per cent of all cases were eliminated from the enforcement process
during this stage. This loss resulted from three factors: (1) the failure
of the Building Department to forward the requested inspection reports to the CAO during the inspection step (10%); (2) the failure of
the CAO to request breakdown reports during the request step (18%);
and (3) the failure of the housing consultants to file the breakdown
reports during the breakdown step (11%). No cases were lost during
the initiation step. The greatest amount of leakage occurred within
the CCDPA itself, where 29 per cent of the original complaints were
lost.118
115 Because of the confusion in the breakdown records for 1968, there is a possibility
for error in .the figure for the number of cases for which the CAO did not request a
breakdown report; however, we believe the combined figure for failure by the CAO to
request breakdowns and the failure by housing consultants to return breakdown reports
is an accurate record of the overall performance of the CCDPA in the breakdown report
process.
116 The reader should compare the lack of a systematic follow-up procedure on referrals made to the Building Department for inspections during 1968-69 with the lack of
any follow-up procedure for breakdown requests forwarded to the housing consultants.
See notes 108-9 and accompanying text supra.
117 The data indicates that complaints initiated by the Building Department receive
different treatment by the CCDPA during the breakdown report process. During this
period the case mortality rate of Building Department initiated cases is higher than
that for housing consultant initiated cases. The records indicated that the CAO requested
breakdowns in 82% of all housing consultant initiated cases for which breakdowns were
needed, but in only 71% of the Building Department initiated cases where breakdowns
were needed. Likewise, the housing consultants returned breakdowns in a higher percentage of the cases which they initiated. Breakdowns were returned in 89% of the housing
consultant initiated cases for which the CAO requested breakdowns, whereas breakdowns
were returned in only 69% of the Building Department initiated cases for which breakdowns were requested.
118 The staff members at the CAO contend that most problems in the administration
of the rent withholding program were caused by the Building Department's failure to
return inspection reports. Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38. At the 1968 Hearings,
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(b) Case mortality in the withholding stage. The withholding stage
of administration, outlined in Figure 1, begins when the housing consultant returns the breakdown report to the CAO. The CAO received
breakdown reports for 61 per cent of the cases in the sample. These
reports indicated recipient occupancy in almost three-fourths of these
Figure 5

CASE MORTALITY IN WITHHOLDING STAGE
100%-TOTAL COMPLAINTS RECEIVED AT CAO

Public old recipients
resided In building

44%
+

No recipients
resided In building

17%

Cases lost In
referral stage

39%

Withholding

21%

No withholding
(recipients In building)

2
23%

NO LEAKAGE

,

LEAKAGE

17%

39%

buildings, or in 44 per cent of the total buildings. Thus, 17 per cent
of the original cases were eliminated from the enforcement process
because no public aid recipients lived in the buildings.
The CAO had sufficient information to withhold in the 44 per cent
of the total cases left after completion of the breakdown report procedure. However, the CAO withheld in only 21 per cent of the total
cases, or in less than one-half of the cases for which breakdowns were
received indicating recipient occupancy.
The reasons for not withholding in these cases are numerous. In 43
per cent of the nonwithholding buildings which housed public aid
recipients, or 10 per cent of the total cases, the status of the building
changed so as to prevent withholding. Table 1 indicates the causes of
these changes in status. The failure to withhold in the remaining 57
per cent of the nonwithholding buildings which housed public aid rethe CCDPA presented evidence that the Building Department had failed to return inspection reports in over 2200 cases which the CAO had referred to it during the previous
three years. However, the data shows that for all cases initiated in 1968 only 10% were
lost because of the failure of the Building Department to conduct an inspection. In
other words, the CAO received as much cooperation from the Building Department on
the return of inspection reports as it received from its own housing consultants on the
return of breakdown reports.
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TABLE 1
CAUSES

OF NONwrrsOuDING IN BUILDINGS

CONTAINING

AT THE TIME OF THE BREAKDOWN

REcIPmT OcCUPANTs

REPORT

Per Cent of
Buildings Housing
Recipients at Time

Cause
Demolished, abandoned
or fire-gutted before
withholding effected
Public aid recipients
moved before withholding
effected
No withholding pending
housing consultant report

Compliance before withholding
Administrative problems in
obtaining notification letters

Per Cent of
Total Sample

of Breakdown not
Withheld Against

1

4

8.5

15

0.5

5

2

22

13

57

23

100

cipients, or 13 per cent of the total cases, was due to administrative
problems in obtaining notification letters. 119
Of the 21 per cent of the buildings which finally reached withholding,
nearly two-thirds either remained substandard at the end of the period
studied or were removed from the housing market by demolition,
abandonment or fire.120 Only 7.5 per cent of all buildings were brought
into compliance with code standards after withholding and before the
end of the period studied.
(c) Conclusions as to case mortality. The data reveals five important
facts regarding case mortality: (1) 79 per cent of all cases were eliminated from enforcement during the administrative process. (2) 67 per
cent of this mortality was due to preventable administrative problems,
while 33 per cent was due to nonpreventable factors, such as lack of
recipient occupancy or changes in the status of the buildings. (3) While
significant leakage was expected in the withholding stage, due to
changes in status, leakage in the referral stage, almost equalling that in
withholding, was surprisingly high. (4) The Building Department was
more efficient in returning inspection reports during the referral stage
than anticipated. (5) Leakage in the breakdown report process, administered solely by the CCDPA, was significantly greater than expected.
8. Delay in Enforcement. This section examines delay in both the
119 For a more complete explanation, see notes 153-8 and accompanying text infra.
120 Since the study ended at an arbitrary point in time, it is likely that some additional
buildings will later reach compliance. See Table 5 and accompanying text infra.
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referral and withholding stages of the enforcement process. The median
time required for either withholding or compliance before withholding
was 156 days, 12 1 and only 4 per cent of the cases reaching this point did
122
so within 60 days.
(a) Delay in the referral stage. The referral stage, outlined in Figure
1, can be divided into four time periods. 123 The initiation period is
the time between initial inspection 124 by the housing consultant and
referral of the housing survey report to the Building Department. 25
During this period the housing consultant and his investigators prepare
the housing survey report. After the landlord is notified that his building is substandard, the report is sent to the CAO, which files the report
and forwards a copy to the Building Department. The median time
required for completion of this process was 10 days. At the end of 15
days, more than 80 per cent of the cases had completed the process, but
after 51 days, 5 per cent still had not been referred to the Building
126
Department.
121 In many respects it is inaccurate to speak of an "average number of days" because
of the nature of the distribution. Therefore, we will concentrate on median time, which
is a more meaningful figure.
122 The Department contends that in an emergency situation it can withhold rents
within a two-week period. Interview with Victor Spallone, supra note 44. Either there

were no emergencies in our sample or the Department is unable to achieve this goal.
There were no cases that required less than 40 days.
123 See note 100 supra.
124 When the Building Department is the source of the complaint, the date of initiation
represents the day on which the CCDPA receives a copy of the Chancery Court complaint.
When the housing consultants are the source, the date of initiation represents the day on
which the inspector completes his report, which is usually the date of inspection.
The day on which the district office first receives a complaint on a particular building
was not available; however, most inspections are performed by the housing consultants
within the month the complaints are received. For example, during 1968 the housing consultants for all of Cook County had on hand at the first of each month an average of 99
pending inspections, and received an average of 3351 new inspection requests each month.
Of this combined average of 3450 inspections to be performed, the housing consultants
disposed of an average of 3347. Housing Consultants Monthly Report, supra note 32.
Also, in those cases which were initiated by the filing of a housing survey report, we
obtained the number of days which elapsed between the completion of the report by the
inspector and the review of the report by the housing consultant. There was no record
of the date on which the housing consultants referred the housing survey reports to the
CAO. For the vast majority of cases, however, this should be an automatic referral with
no appreciable time lag. See note 35 and accompanying text supra. One housing consultant informed us that there is usually a two-day delay in mail delivery between the
CAO and the districts. Interview with Housing Consultant, supra note 34.
125 The date available for the referral of the housing survey report to the Building
Department was the day on which the CAO sent the request for a report to the Building
Department. The initiation step does not include cases initiated by the Building Department since no further inspection is required in those cases because the copy of the
Chancery Court complaint contains an official list of the code violations in the building.
126 In 75% of the cases initiated by the housing consultant, the number of days which
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Once the housing survey report has been referred to the Building
Department for inspection, the case enters the second step in the referral stage-the inspection period.127 This period measures the time
required by the Building Department to return an inspection report to
the CAO.
The statute requires that upon request by the CCDPA, the Building
Department "shall promptly investigate and report its finding" to the
CCDPA. 128 The median time required by the Building Department to
return the inspection report was 21 days. At the end of one month the
Building Department had returned reports in 63 per cent of the cases
for which reports were eventually returned, and29at the end of two
months reports had been returned in 84 per cent.
Once the CAO receives the building inspection report, it must wait
for a breakdown report on the number of public aid recipients living
in the building before it can withhold. 30 This third step, or request
period, is the time the CAO requires to request breakdown reports. 131
The median delay in the request procedure was 5 days. At the end of
15 days requests had been made in 78 per cent of the cases, but 50 or
more days were required in 4 per cent of the cases.
32
The final step in the referral stage is the breakdown report period
During this step the housing consultant determines the number of
public aid recipients living in the building. His investigation involves
either a personal visit to the building or contact with the building's
caseworker. 33 The median time housing consultants required to obtain
elapsed between the completion of the housing survey report by the investigator and
the review by the housing consultant was only five days or less. Usually the housing
consultant merely checks the investigators housing survey report to see if it is filled out
properly. Occasionally the housing consultant will inspect the building himself to check
on the investigators' diligence. Interview with Housing Consultant, supra note 34.
127 See note 100 supra.
128 ILL. RV. STAT. ch. 23,

§ 11-23 (1969) (emphasis added).

129 The Building Department often does not make a new inspection, but instead simply

forwards the results of an earlier inspection. In 20% of the sample cases the Building
Department returned inspection reports based on inspections which were conducted before

the referral of the housing survey report to the Building Department, and in 8% of the
sample cases the inspection was conducted as much as three months before the report
was requested. This procedure allowed the Building Department to improve its per-

centage of cumulative return: in 90% of the cases where prior inspection information
was used, inspection reports were returned to the CAO within 30 days; where the inspection

date followed the referral date, the rate of return was 54% within 30 days.
130 For 1968, information on the breakdown report process was confused and often no
dates were available for either the date on which the request was sent to the district
office or the date on which the report was returned to the CAO or both. For those breakdowns requested during 1969, the records were organized and complete.
131 See note 100 supra.
132 Id.

133 in 1969 the CAO initiated a new system for the breakdown report process which
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the breakdown and return it to the CAO was 20 days. At the end of
40 days 74 per cent had been returned, and all but 2 per cent were
returned within 90 days. Thus, although the Building Department
inspection took an average of 35 days, as compared with 29 days in the
breakdown report step, the median for both was almost identical (see
Table 2).'1 4
The receipt by the CAO of the breakdown report from the district
office marks the end of the referral stage. The median time required for
cases to reach this point was 78 days and the average time required was
92 days. Although 80 per cent of the cases which completed the referral
35
stage did so within 40 days, 24 per cent took more than 120 days.
Those cases which eventually reached withholding moved more rapidly through the referral stage than those which dropped out of the
enforcement process (see Table 2). The average time required for a
withholding case to complete this stage was 80 days, as compared with
98 days for nonwithholding cases. The medians were 65 and 81 days,
respectively. As shown in Table 2, the most significant cause of the
disparity between withholding and nonwithholding cases was the
actions of housing consultants during the breakdown report step.
(b) Delay in the withholding stage. During the withholding stage,
outlined in Figure 1, all action is centered in the CAO, which must
prepare and mail the notification letter. If the return receipt on the
certified mail is received, signed by the addressee or his agent, the CAO
authorizes withholding 10 to 12 days after mailing1 36
In those cases which reached either withholding or compliance before
withholding, the median time from the receipt of the breakdown report
probably lengthened the time required for this step. This system involved a two-month
time lag, whereby the district offices would receive lists of buildings only every two months.
Beginning May 8, 1970, the CAO began requesting breakdowns immediately after receiv-

ing the Building Department reports. See note 112 supra.
134 These figures would seem to rebut the Building Department's reputation for poor

performance, a reputation widely expressed in personal comments of CAO staff members
and in testimony delivered by the CCDPA at the 1968 Hearings, supra note 28.
It would appear that the performances of the Building Department and the Department's housing consultants are approximately the same with regard to both the time

required to submit the requested report and the proportion of reports actually returned.
See Figure 4 supra. Although Building Department initiated cases had a higher proportion
of drop-outs during the breakdown report process than housing consultant initiated cases,
see note 117 supra, the data indicates that the speeds at which the housing consultants

return the breakdown reports are virtually identical. The average time required for a
Building Department initiated case to be processed at this step was 28 days as compared
with 30 days for housing consultant initiated cases, and the median was 20 days for both.
135 See Figure 4 supra, which provides a summary of case mortality in the referral stage.
136 See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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to the actual withholding 137 or compliance before withholding 38 was
78 days. Only 10 per cent of the cases completing this stage did so within
40 days, and 28 per cent required over 120 days. 139
The time between withholding and compliance involves factors outside the CGDPA's control, and will therefore be considered separately. 140
(c) Conclusions as to delay. Because comparably fewer tasks are involved in the withholding stage, one might expect this stage to require
significantly less time than the referral stage. A comparison of the
time required in each of these stages, however, reveals that the average
number of days required in the referral stage is 4 less than in the withholding stage and that the medians are identical (see Table 2).
The period of time required for a case to move from initiation to
withholding was surprisingly long. As Table 3 shows, only 17 per cent
of the cases which completed the process did so within 90 days, and

after 180 days 34 per cent still had not completed the process. 141
187 The actual date on which the caseworker deleted the rents from the public aid
recipient's check was not available. The only withholding date available was the day on
which the CAO sent the order to withhold to the district office. How rapidly the rents
were actually deleted from the check would depend on the district office procedure and
efficiency. Further, since the checks are prepared at the State Comptroller's office in Springfield, an order to withhold rents sent from the CAO at the end of June would not result
in withholding until the August monthly public aid check. The checks are prepared
alphabetically in groups, e.g., all checks for persons whose last names end in A through D
are prepared at a certain time. If the change in the monthly budget which reflects the
rent deletion arrives at the Comptroller's office after the preparation of the check, then
the withholding must wait another month. Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
138 The day on which the landlord brought his building up to code standards was the
compliance date. However, the day on which the landlord actually completes his repairs
was not available, and the date used for compliance was the date on which the housing
consultant inspected and found the building to be up to standard. This could have
occurred either before the withholding notice had been mailed, after the notice of withholding had been given but before the actual withholding, or after withholding. There
were few instances where compliance occurred before the withholding and most information available on compliance involved cases in which withholding actually took place.
139 Again, as was discussed in connection with the breakdown report, see note 117
supra, it is interesting to note the apparently different treatment given cases originating
in the Building Department and those originating in the CCDPA's district offices. If we
take the time period from the receipt of a Building Department inspection report, or in
cases initiated by the Building Department from the receipt of the Chancery Court
complaint, to the actual withholding of rents or compliance before withholding, we find
that the average time for housing consultant initiated cases to be processed was 121 days,
whereas the average for Building Department initiated cases was 126 days. However, the
median for housing consultant initiated cases which completed this process was 111 days
while the same figure for Building Department initiated cases was 97 days. Also interesting to note is that whereas 18% of those housing consultant initiated cases which completed this process had moved through the time period within 60 days, no Building
Department initiated cases had been processed within this time.
140 See Table 5 and accompanying text infra.
141 As one would have expected, the Building Department initiated cases reached with-
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TABLE 2
ANALYSIS OF DELAY
MEDIAN No. of
Days Required to
Complete Stage
and/or Steps

AVERAGE No. of
Days Required to
Complete Stage
and/or Steps
Stage and Steps
in Administration
of Withholding
Statute

All
Cases

Entire withholding
process: initiation
to withholding
or compliance

-

Referral Stage

92

a.
b.
c.
d.

Initiation step
Inspection step
Request step
Breakdown

Withholding Stage

Withholding
Cases

167

Nonwithholding
Cases

All
Cases

Withholding
Cases

156

Nonwithholding
Cases

-

-

80

98

78

65

81

15
85
15
29

16
88
11
27

14
84
15
80

10
21
5
20

7
20
5
13

11
21
5
21

-

96

-

-

78

-

-

TABLE 8
OVERALL ADMINISTRATION: INITIATION To WITHHOLDING

Number of
Days
Frequency
Cumulative
Frequency

0-90
17%

91-120
18%

121-450
7%

151-180
24%

181-210
10%

211-240
7%

241-330
17%

17%

35%

42%

66%

76%

83%

100%

Median = 156 days
100%- =those cases where either compliance was achieved before withholding (but
after letter sent) or rents were withheld (24% of the sample cases).

B. An Evaluation of Enforcement
This section examines the limited nature of the CCDPA's enforcement scheme and the general effectiveness of withholding as a means
to induce landlord compliance.
1. An Evaluation of Enforcement-Limited Enforcement. Since the
holding much quicker than those cases initiated by the housing consultants because there
is no need to refer the complaints to the Building Department for inspection, since the
Chancery Court complaints, which list the violations, are based on recent inspections.
The CAO needed an average of 172 days to move a housing consultant initiated case from
the date of initial inspection to either withholding or compliance before withholding,
whereas an average of only 150 days was required for Building Department initiated cases.
To complete the entire cycle from initiation to withholding or compliance before withholding, the median for housing consultant initiated cases which reached the final stepwas 168 days and the comparable figure for Building Department initiated cases was
149 days.
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CCDPA withheld in only 21 per cent of the cases originally brought to
its attention, the rent withholding program as presently administered
may be appropriately characterized as a limited enforcement scheme.
Limited enforcement may be preferable to full enforcement if either:
(1) the enforcing agency has limited resources, or (2) the additional costs
of increased enforcement (including demolition) outweigh the incremental benefits (primarily compliance) of greater enforcement. A limited enforcement scheme, to be effective, must be based on objective
standards for determining which cases require withholding. If cases are
eliminated from the enforcement process because of administrative
problems, arbitrary decision making or random selection, enforcement
will be less effective than it might otherwise be.
An analysis of the reasons for case mortality in the administrative
process reveals that the CCDPA's limited enforcement scheme is primarily a result of administrative problems rather than of a conscious
policy to restrict the scope of enforcement. The CAO failed to withhold in 79 per cent of the original cases. Twenty-six per cent of the cases
dropped from the enforcement process because either no recipient resided in the building or there was a change in the status of the building. 14 2 Since the CAO could not prevent the exclusion of these cases
under any system, they will be disregarded for the purposes of this
analysis. By focusing on the remaining 53 per cent, however, we can
attempt to determine the extent to which case mortality was due to
administrative problems and the extent to which it was due to a conscious policy of restricting enforcement. Moreover, if such a conscious
policy exists, this analysis may reveal what standards, if any, are
143
applied.
Ten per cent of the cases were lost in the Building Department by
its failure to return the required inspection reports. 44 Although the
142 The change in status referred to was due to either (1) no recipients resided in
the building (17%), (2) the recipients who did reside in the building moved before withholding was effected (3.5%), (3) the building burned down, was abandoned or was
demolished before withholding (1%), or (4) the landlord repaired the building before
the rents were withheld (5%). See Table 1 and Figure 5 supra.
143 It should be noted that the CAO staff consistently maintained that the only standard applied was that expressed in the statute: "... . a condition dangerous, hazardous or
detrimental to life or health .... " ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-23 (1969). Interview with
CAO staff, supra note 38. However, this standard was of no help in determining why this
53% of the total sample dropped from the enforcement process.
144 Since we did not make an in depth study of the Building Department, we do not
know why these cases were lost. It is unlikely that the Building Department found no
violations and thus did not return a report. See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
The 1968 Hearings, which were held to investigate alleged improprieties of the Building
Department in the enforcement of the building code, may provide an answer. see notes
67 & 118 supra.
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CAO had no direct control over this loss, it could have significantly
reduced it by persistently following up when reports were not re-

turned. 145 It is unclear why the CAO followed up in some cases and not
in others.
Forty-three per cent of the cases were lost within the CCDPA itself.
The CAO's records indicate that 18 per cent were lost because it failed
to request breakdown reports from the housing consultants.14 There
is no indication that the CAO intentionally decided to eliminate these
cases from enforcement. In fact, as a result of the automatic breakdown
procedure followed by the CAO,'147 potential withholding cases did not

even come to the attention of staff members until after breakdowns
were filed. Thus, it is likely that this leakage was due to either administrative inefficiency 148 or lack of manpower.14 9
Housing consultants eliminated 11.5 per cent of the cases by failing
to return breakdown reports (I1 per cent) and status reports (0.5 per
cent). The CAO made no systematic attempt to follow up in these
cases. 150 Since the CAO staff did not enter the process until after break-

downs were received, the failure to follow up was probably due to administrative problems within the CAO. On the district office level,
administrative problems undoubtedly caused some of this leakage, but

it is possible that in some cases the housing consultants decided not to
fie reports.'"' If such decisions were in fact made, the standards used,
6 52
if any, are unknown'

See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
146 See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
147 See notes 111-7 and accompanying text sulra.
148 One case initiated by the Building Department involved a modem apartment complex which obviously housed no public aid recipients. It might be possible that other cases
involving buildings in which it was known that no public aid recipients resided were
eliminated. However, if this occurs regularly, our interviews with CAO staff members did
not reveal it. Further, over one-half of the cases for which breakdowns were not requested
were initiated by the housing consultants, and on cases originating in the district offices,
mere street addresses could not be used to determine whether public aid recipients lived
in the building.
149 The CAO asserted at all times that more personnel were needed to enforce the
statute. Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
150 See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
151 For example, the housing consultant may have known that no recipients lived in the
building because of the quality of the building or the neighborhood.
152 We did not study the district office procedures in depth, but rather focused on
decision making in the CAO. However, there is no indication from the CAO files that the
individual housing consultants followed any formalized or uniform standards in exercising
their discretion. There was definitely no CAO policy memorandum to guide them. It
may be that housing consultants negotiated with landlords concerning repair and secured
landlord cooperation. This is unlikely for most of the dropouts, however, because in only
a few of the cases for which-no breakdown was received was the building eventually repaired. Housing consultants failed to return breakdown reports in 23 sample cases. In
145
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The CAO failed to withhold in 13 per cent of the cases even though
Building Department inspection reports and breakdown reports were
available. According to the CAO, a delay in the printing of new notification letters153 caused all but 3 per cent of this loss.l Since this delay
lasted until January, 1970, the CAO maintains that it withheld in only
the worst cases in

1969.155 It
50 Since

the worst buildings.

is unclear how it determined which were

it did withhold in some cases in 1969, it

response to our questionnaire, housing consultants reported having made an inspection
more recent than the first in only 13 cases. Of these 13 cases, 4 buildings were standard
after the second inspection.
However, one would think that if a housing consultant had in fact negotiated with the
landlord and secured cooperation, he would have filed a report with the CAO. One CAO
staff member stated that the failure to return a breakdown report or a report on the
condition of the building is pure inefficiency on the part of the housing consultant. Interview with CAO staff, supra note 88.
153 A form notification letter is used to inform landlords of withholding. See note 40
and accompanying text supra. New letters were required because of the appointment of a
new CCDPA director (January 20, 1969) and the passage of an amendment to the statute
(effective July 24, 1969) relating to the 20% penalty provisions. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
154 The data supports this claim. First, all of the cases comprising this 10% of the
sample fell within the permissible dates. In other words, the CAO did not receive the
Building Department inspection report and the breakdown report until 1969; therefore,
when the case was ripe for withholding, the proper forms were not available. Second, if
this was evidence of something more, such as a policy of restricting the scope of enforcement, it was peculiar to 1969. We found no such mass failure to withhold by the CAO for
cases which were initiated in the first half of 1968. Further, it is interesting to note that
rents were withheld in 21% of the total cases in the sample-18% in 1968 and 3% in
1969. Since the withholdings in the sample should have been approximately equally divided
between the two years, this tends to substantiate the claim that in 1969 rents were withheld from only a small number of buildings.
155 Interview with CAO staff, supra note 38.
156 The files for withholding and nonwithholding buildings in 1969 did not indicate
any differences in the conditions of the buildings in each of these two groups. The data
on the quality of housing conditions was inconclusive on this point, however. A major
problem in accumulating such data was that the breakdown reports usually reported the
total number of occupants and total rental grant for all families in the building, but
did not report the actual number of dwelling units in such buildings. Table A attempts
to compensate for this lack of information by use of that information which was available.
Table A shows that the rental grant per recipient was higher in the nonwithholding
buildings than in the withholding buildings. This difference could result from several
variables: (I) the number of rooms in the apartment; (2) housing conditions; (3) occupancy
rates and (4) maintenance services. A study conducted by the CCDPA indicates that
whereas rental grants are larger in buildings in sound condition, grants are also larger in
those buildings with more than one person per room, with the poorest maintenance
services and with the most code violations. CCDPA, CASTLFs OF THE POOR: A STUDY OF
HOUSING CONDITIONS OF PUBLIc Am FA~mTs IN CooX CouNTY, ILLINOIS 160-2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CAs'rLs or TnE POOR].
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is difficult to understand why it could not withhold in all cases. 157 Moreover, it is even more difficult to understand why the CAO did not
attempt to avoid the problems caused by the printing delay by simply
obtaining the necessary letter through some alternate means.
Finally, in 3 per cent of the cases the CAO received both the Building Department report and the breakdown report in adequate time to
withhold in 1968, but did not withhold. 158 No action was taken on these
TABLE A
Rental grant
per recipient*

Public aid
recipients per
dwelling unit**

Rental grant
paid per
dwelling unit***

NONWITHHOLDING
Buildings which were
known to be substandard
and to house public aid
recipients, but from which
no rents were withheld

$20.69

1.87

$58.71

WITHHOLDING
Buildings which had
rents withheld

$17.14

1.54

$23.04

Rental grant per recipient = total public aid rent allotments paid divided by total
number of public aid recipients in the building.
Public aid recipients per
dwelling unit
= total public aid recipients in the building divided by
total dwelling units in the building (total dwelling
units in the building = public aid recipient occupied
+ nonrecipient occupied).
Rental grant paid per
dwelling unit
= total rental grants for the entire building divided by
total dwelling units in the building (total dwelling
units in the building = public aid recipient occupied
+ nonrecipient occupied).
The ratio of public aid recipients per dwelling unit was greater in the nonwithholding
buildings than in the withholding buildings. This ratio represents either a larger number
of recipients residing in one unit or many recipient occupied units in the building. Since
the monthly rental grants are based on the number in the household and also on the
number of rooms in the units, id. at 166, the most likely explanation for the larger
rental grant per recipient is larger apartments rather than buildings in better condition.
In fact, if the recipient per dwelling unit ratio represents a large number of recipients
per dwelling unit, the indications are that the units are in poorer condition. Id. at 42.
157 The CAO staff said that when the form letter problem first arose, it refrained from
withholding because it did not believe it could legally do so without the proper letter.
Later, it decided that since the old form letter did state that the withholding would be
done pursuant to the statute and any amendments thereto, withholding could be legally
effected. It was, however, still reluctant to withhold in all possible cases. Interview with
CAO staff, supra note 38.
158 It should be noted that this 3% consisted of two cases, one of which was under
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cases until 1969, at which time the problems with the form letter prevented withholding.
In sum, it seems that administrative problems were the predominant
cause of the limited nature of the CCDPA's enforcement scheme. Moreover, in those instances where cases might have been intentionally eliminated from enforcement, there is no indication that either the GAO
or the housing consultants applied objective standards in making such
decisions.
2. An Evaluation of Enforcement-Effectiveness of Withholding.
While the CCDPA's limited enforcement scheme leaves much to be
desired, particularly in the way of standards, the withholding of rents
appears to be a relatively effective means of coercing landlords to repair.
A comparison between withholding buildings and nonwithholding
buildings housing public aid recipients reveals that compliance was
achieved in 36 per cent of the withholding buildings as opposed to
only 22 per cent of the nonwithholding buildings. Since both groups
of buildings were in approximately the same condition, 159 the higher
rate of compliance for withholding buildings indicates that withholding
is an effective tool for inducing compliance.
A second factor to be considered is the fact that the 36 per cent compliance rate is essentially open ended, since some withholding cases
which did not reach compliance by the conclusion of this study may
later do so. This is likely because the median time required for compliance after withholding was 240 days (see Table 5). For example, 45
per cent of the 1968 withholding cases reached compliance by the time
the study was concluded, whereas none of the 1969 withholding cases
had done so. This factor is important for evaluating the general effectiveness of withholding, but may not be relevant for examining its
effectiveness relative to nonwithholding, for the 22 per cent compliance
rate for nonwithholding cases is also open ended.
A third factor to be considered in determining the effectiveness of
withholding is the cause of noncompliance. Withholding failed to induce compliance in 64 per cent of the withholding cases. In 5 per cent
of these cases, compliance was not achieved because the building was
either demolished or destroyed.8 0 The loss of the remaining 59 per cent
a Chicago Dwelling Association (CDA) receivership. One CAO staff member stated the
CCDPA did not withhold from buildings which it knew to be in CDA receivership
since this would constitute action by the County Department against the efforts of a
city department." Statement of Mr. Morton Miller, Administrative Assistant, Housing
Bureau, CCDPA, May 29, 1970. There are no records indicating that a CAO staff member chose not to withhold on a building for that reason.
159 This is inferred from the fact that demolition rates for the two groups were virtually
identical. See notes 167-8 and accompanying text infra.
160 See note 167 and accompanying text infra.
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appears to be due to one of two factors: either the recipient moved soon
after withholding, or the landlord simply refused to comply even
though his rents were being withheld. Since 98 per cent of the withholding buildings still had recipient occupants three and one-half
months after withholding, the first factor is probably not a significant
cause of noncompliance.""' Thus, it appears that the predominant cause
of noncompliance was the landlord's weighing the cost of repair against
the cost of lost rents and deciding that it would be cheaper not to repair. This proposition is supported by Table 4, which indicates that
the compliance rate increased as the rent withheld per dwelling unit
increased. 1 62 However, as Figures 6 and 7 illustrate, this correlation is
TABLE 4
LEVERAGE IN WVITHHOLDING

All withholding
cases
Compliance
cases
Noncompliance
cases

Rental Grant
per
Redpient*

Public Aid
Recipients
per
Dwelling
Unit**

Rental
Grant
Paid per
Dwelling
Unit-

$17.14

1.84

$23.04

$16.13

1.95

$31.38

$17.97

1.07

$19.24

• Rental grant per recipient= total public aid rent allotments paid divided by total
number of public aid recipients in the building
* Public aid recipients per= total public aid recipients in the building divided by
dwelling unit
total dwelling units in the building (total dwelling units
in the building = public aid recipient occupied-+ nonrecipient occupied).
' Rental grant paid per= total rental grants for the entire building divided by
dwelling unit
total dwelling units in the building (total dwelling units
in the building =public aid recipient occupied-+ nonrecipient occupied).
161 See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
162 The rental grant per recipient was lower for the compliance buildings than the
noncompliance buildings. At the same time the recipient per unit ratio was almost twice
as high in the compliance cases. These factors together indicate that the apartments have
approximately the same number of rooms and the same number of recipients per unit
because rental grants are dependent on the number in the household and the number
of rooms in the dwelling unit. CASTLES OF THE POOR, supra note 156, at 166. In fact, since
the rental grant per recipient is greater in the noncompliance cases, the data might indicate
that units in the noncompliance cases are slightly larger. Id. Thus, the recipient per
unit figure for the compliance cases would represent not a concentration of recipients in
dwelling units but a concentration of recipient occupied units in the building. The
rental grant per dwelling unit reflects the greater amount of monetary leverage exercised against the landlord in the compliance cases as contrasted with the noncompliance
cases.
There appeared to be a positive correlation between the length of time required to
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Figure 6

LEVERAGE AS A FACTOR OF RENTAL GRANT
PAID PER DWELLING UNIT*

89%

50%

O--N oncomplian ce
lCompliance

UNDER $16

RENTAL GRANT
PAID PER
DWELLING UNIT

I00%=ALL WITHHOLDING CASES
IN SAMPLE WITH RENTAL GRANT
PAID PER DWELLING UNIT UNDER
$16

$16 OR MORE

I00%=ALL WITHHOLDING CASES
IN SAMPLE WITH RENTAL GRANT
PAID PER DWELLING UNIT $16
OR MORE

0 Rental grant paid per dwelling unit= total rental grants for the entire building
divided by total dwelling units in the building.

not complete. It appears that there is a threshold level, which may be
expressed as either 1.5 recipients per dwelling unit or $16 rental grant
achieve compliance after withholding of rents and the leverage factor. We averaged the
public aid recipient per unit ratio for compliance cases in groups arranged by the time
required to achieve compliance after withholding. Assuming from the above discussion that
the public aid recipient per unit ratio represents concentrations of public aid recipient
units in a building, we believe that a correlation between leverage and the required time
for compliance is shown. For example, for those cases which reached compliance within
180 days after withholding, there was an average of approximately 3 recipients per dwelling
unit, while those cases requiring over 180 days had an average of approximately 1.8
recipients per dwelling unit.
Further, a policy of withholding from buildings with a greater number of recipient
occupied units would not appear to increase the rate of demolition among withholding
buildings. For the two withholding buildings in the sample which were demolished, the
public aid recipient per unit ratios were 1.3 and 3.5 respectively. Although inconclusive
the figures would tend to indicate that there is no correlation between the amount of
leverage and demolition.
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Figure 7

LEVERAGE AS A FACTOR OF THE NUMBER
OF RECIPIENTS PER DWELLING UNIT*

41%

76%

I"JNoncomplliane
wCompllance

59%

24%
1.5
OR LESS

NUMBER OF
RECIPIENTS PER
DWELLING UNIT

IO0%= ALL WITHHOLDING CASES
IN SAMPLE WITH LESS THAN 1.5
RECIPIENTS PER DWELLING
UNIT

MORE
THAN .5.

IO0%=ALLWItHHOLDING CASES
IN SAMPLE WITH 1.5 OR MORE
RECIPIENTS PER DWELLING
UNIT

• Number of recipients per dwelling unit=total number of recipients in building
divided by total number of dwelling units in building.

per dwelling unit, below which compliance is rarely achieved. This
indicates that landlords are refusing to repair because the cost of repair
is significantly greater than the cost of lost rents. Above the threshold
level withholding often induces compliance; but above this level the
compliance rate remains relatively constant-it does not increase proportionately to increased withholding. This indicates that some factor
other than relative cost is being considered. The data collected in this
study does not reveal the nature of this additional factor. It is clear,
however, that at least below the threshold level the relative costs of
withholding and repair are considered by landlords, and that below
this level compliance is unlikely. Thus, it can be concluded that rent
withholding, by itself, necessarily fails to induce compliance in a significant number of cases where the cost of compliance exceeds the withholding penalty.
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This deficiency may be eliminated to some extent by the 20 per cent
penalty provision enacted in 1969,163 which would substantially increase
the cost of noncompliance. The effects of this provision cannot be
measured by this study, however, for the CCDPA did not begin implementing it until after the study was concluded. 164
A fourth indication of the effectiveness of rent withholding is the
speed with which withholding can be effected. The median time required for a case to move from initiation to withholding was surprisingly high-156 days (see Table 3). While the necessity of conforming
to statutory procedural requirements caused some of this delay, the
predominant cause was administrative problems. 165 Thus, the withholding statute should not necessarily be judged ineffective on this
ground. Significantly, 17 per cent of the cases reaching withholding did
so within 90 days.
A final measure of the effectiveness of rent withholding may be the
amount of time required for compliance after withholding. The median
time required for compliance after withholding was 240 days, although
as Table 5 shows, 36 per cent of the cases reaching compliance did so
within 150 days. The use of the 20 per cent penalty provision might
significantly reduce the time required for compliance. Since a comparison of the time required for compliance in a withholding enforcement
163 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
164 The CCDPA did not begin implementing the provision in earnest until early 1970

because it did not receive the proper form letter until then. See notes 153-7 and accompanying text supra. The probable effect of the provision would be to raise the cost of
noncompliance, thereby lowering the threshold level so as to enable a higher compliance
rate.
165 During the withholding stage the explanation for much of the delay was the procedure followed in 1968 and 1969 of withholding in groups, and not withholding as each
case arrived at that stage. The Department justifies this procedure on two grounds.
First, mass processing of withholdings is more efficient, and, because of the limited staff,
this procedure must be followed. Second, withholding on a great number of buildings
at the same time gives the low income housing problem more publicity.
Another aspect of delay involved in the withholding stage occurred in the process of
notifying the landlord of withholding action. The order to withhold rents was sent to
the district office within 10 to 12 days after the letter was mailed to the landlord in all
but 11% of the cases in which rent was withheld. In this 11% of the cases the landlords
claimed that repairs had been made, and the CAO delayed withholding action until
a later report could be obtained from the housing consultant. In all of these cases, rent
was eventually withheld and the average delay between the initial letter and the actual
withholing was 72 days.
Further, in 15% of the cases in which rents were withheld, two letters had to be sent
to notify the landlord because the first was returned undelivered. In these cases there
was an average delay of 92 days between the initial letter and the actual withholding.
In addition, there are some delays built into the statutory requirements. For example,
the requirement that the Building Department verify violations adds an average of 85
days to the withholding process. Also, the statute allows the landlords a ten-day grace
period after notification of withholding and before withholding may be instituted.

19701
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TABLE 5
TIME REQUIRED FOR COMPLIANCE THROUGH WITHHOLDING

Number of
Days
Frequency
in per
cent
Cumulative

090

90150

150210

210270

270330

330390

390450

14

21

7

14

29

7

-

86

93

150510
7

Frequency
in per

57
45
36
14
cent
Median = 240 days
100% =withholding cases which reached compliance

93

100

scheme with the time required by other code enforcement techniques,
such as those used by the Building Department, cannot be made in
this study, it cannot be determined whether this time is inordinately
long. However, in light of the fact that rent withholding is intended to
alleviate conditions endangering life or health, it does seem that compliance through withholding is unduly slow.
C. Criteriafor Efficient Enforcement
While the CCDPA's withholding program appears to be a more
effective means of inducing landlord compliance than enforcement
without withholding, the program has achieved only limited effectiveness. The CCDPA withheld in only 21 per cent of the cases, and compliance was achieved in only 7.5 per cent. The absence of a conscious
policy of restricting the scope of enforcement indicates that the CCDPA
attempted to withhold in all cases meeting the statutory requirements
for withholding, but that it failed to achieve this goal because of administrative inefficiency and lack of adequate manpower. Thus, the cases in
which the CGDPA eventually did withhold did not necessarily contain
the most serious violations and were not necessarily the most likely to
result in compliance.
The withholding program may be made more effective by either:
(1) a significant influx of additional manpower to enable the CCDPA
to withhold in all cases meeting the statutory requirements for withholding; or (2) the adoption of a conscious policy of restricting the
scope of enforcement coupled with a reallocation of existing manpower
to eliminate administrative leakage and the formulation of objective
standards for determining which cases require withholding.
In deciding whether full enforcement (alternative 1) or limited enforcement (alternative 2) is more desirable for Cook County, the competing costs and benefits of full enforcement must be weighed. The
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two most significant costs of full enforcement are the increased administrative expenses and the possible shrinkage of the low income housing
market.16 6 The first of these costs, increased administrative expenses,
would be due to the additional manpower that would be required at
both the CAO and district office levels if the present administrative
problems are to be avoided.
More important is the possible effect of full enforcement on the low
income housing market. The study indicates that the rates of demolition for withholding buildings and nonwithholding buildings housing
public aid recipients are almost identical.16 7 Thus, it can be presumed
that both groups of buildings were in approximately the same condition
and that the condition of housing has more causal relation to demolition than does withholding. 6 8
166 It has long been recognized that one of the dangers of strict enforcement of city
building codes is the possibility that the low income housing market may be sharply reduced. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, supra note 11, at 802. A strictly
enforced rent withholding program might have the same effect as strict enforcement
of the building codes. By denying a landlord income from the building which is substandard, the landlord must either raise the rents charged to tenants in order to cover
the cost of repair, or demolish or abandon buildings.
In Chicago, the low income housing situation has reached crisis proportions.
Demolition of low income housing units has by far exceeded the number of new
units constructed. Programs of rehabilitation for substandard structures have not
been sufficiently accelerated to meet the growing demands of the community for
decent low income housing. Slum clearance programs have bulldozed many
blighted areas, but frequently the land reclaimed through that work is used for
the construction of highways, universities, commercial and business structures
and luxury high-rise apartments. These problems are by no means peculiar to
Cook County, and slum clearance across the country frequently means slum moving.
CAsrLES OF THE POOR, supra note 156, at 1.
167 The rates of demolition were 5%o for withholding buildings and 4%o for nonwithholding buildings.
168 If there was a selection process in which rents were withheld only from buildings
in relatively better condition and if the CCDPA now begins a program of full enforcement, in which it also withholds against buildings in worse condition, it is possible that
the demolition rate will increase. Although the Department maintains that it withholds
against all substandard buildings which come to its attention without regard to varying
degrees of quality among these buildings, the data neither confirms nor denies this. See
note 156 supra.
However, in cases where it admits to having exercised discretion in the selection of
cases for withholding (e.g., the 1969 withholdings, see note 155 and accompanying text
supra), the CAO states that rents were withheld against what it considered to be the
buildings in the worst condition. Although again the data does not confirm or deny this,
see note 156 supra, if it is true, then the present demolition rate might not be affected by
full enforcement of the statute.
Further, it should be noted that it is possible that demolitions may also increase if the
Department has refrained from withholding against landlords who it fears will abandon
their buildings if the sanction is applied. Our data does not indicate whether the nature
and reputation of the landlord played any role in the decision whether to withhold. The
Department maintains that it withholds against all landlords whose substandard buildings have come to its attention, and, in fact, prides itself in its successes in forcing "slum.
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However, full enforcement may have two tangential effects on the
low income housing market that are not as susceptible to quantitative
analysis. First, expanded coverage may lead to increased landlord discrimination against public aid recipients. Thus, recipients may find
themselves unable to obtain adequate housing. Second, since landlords
often increase rent after compliance, thereby pricing the building out
of the low income market, increased enforcement may indirectly result
in shrinkage of the low income housing market.
The benefits to be gained from full enforcement might be quite
substantial. During the study, the CCDPA withheld in 336 cases and
achieved compliance in only 120. A fall enforcement scheme, during
the same period, could have resulted in 1194 withholdings and 430
compliances. 169
The increased effectiveness of a full enforcement scheme, which
would result in a more rapid improvement in the conditions of low
income housing, seems to outweigh the incremental costs of such a
scheme. However, if full enforcement cannot be instituted because
additional funds are not forthcoming or the effect on the low income
housing market would be too severe, the CCDPA's present limited enforcement scheme may be greatly improved by a concentrated effort
to eradicate the administrative problems and the arbitrary elimination
of cases from the enforcement process. The objective should be to
eliminate unexplained case mortality and to conserve the CCDPA's
limited resources for use in those cases where compliance is most needed
or most probable.
One method to control the administrative problems would be to designate a group of CAO staff members as coordinators, whose sole job
would be to keep close watch on the flow of cases and to prevent unnecessary leakage. Some of the procedural problems could be avoided
by the adoption of a new detailed operating manual, 170 instructing staff
lords" out of business (although at the same time recognizing that, unfortunately, this
latter result may decrease the low income housing supply).
169 Of the original sample of 204 cases, withholding was effected in 21%, or 42 cases,
and compliance was achieved in 36% of the withholding cases, or 15 cases. Projecting
these figures over all cases initiated in 1968, withholding would be reached in 336 cases
and landlords would comply in 120.
Under a full enforcement scheme, all leakage could be eliminated except that which
is due to either recipient nonoccupancy (10%) or change in status of building (17%).
Thus, withholding could be effected in 73% of the cases, or 1194 cases. Projecting the
compliance rate of 36% to these cases, compliance could be reached in 430 cases. Moreover, since the compliance rate is open ended, compliance might be achieved in an even
greater number of buildings. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
170 Apparently, the CCDPA periodically issues new operating manuals after procedural

problems arise. The most recent manual is Bulletin 70.24, supra note 35, which may solve
some of the problems discussed. We are suggesting, however, that the CCDPA conduct
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members and housing consultants as to exactly what procedures are to
be followed. One solution which is already underway is the adoption of
a computerized filing system, 7 1 which should help the Department
172
make more efficient use of its resources.
Along with the elimination of the administrative problems, the GAO
should adopt objective standards for determining which cases should be
dropped from the enforcement process. In formulating these standards,
at least three factors should be considered. First, since withholding is
aimed at protecting the health and safety of recipients, priority should
be given to buildings containing the most serious violations. Second, the
reparability of the building should be considered. If the building is not
structurally sound, withholding is unlikely to induce lasting repairs.
Third, the Department should consider the leverage that could be
exerted against the landlord. The study indicates that withholding in
buildings with relatively few recipient occupants is unlikely to induce
compliance. 73 Thus, the Department should effect withholding in those
cases where compliance is most probable.
Given the Department's limited resources, it seems that a balancing
of these three factors, on a case by case basis, would allow the CCDPA
to make the most effective use of the withholding statute. The important point is that the Department should develop both standards and
procedures which would insure the most effective use of its resources.
a comprehensive study of the withholding process with the goal of formulating procedures
to eliminate unjustifiable leakage and delay.
171 Telephone conversation with Victor Spallone, Housing Bureau Chief, CCDPA, June
12, 1970.
172 In addition, a study is now underway at the CCDPA concerning the feasibility of
using the receivership law, ILL. R v. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (1969), in conjunction with
rent withholding in order to use withheld rents for rehabilitation of noncompliance
buildings.
173 See notes 160-4 and accompanying text supra.

